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"Merleau-Ponty's Dissolution of the 'Problem of the Other':
A New Vision for Ethics":
Traditional accounts of the mind have been biased toward the 
interiority of the mind. This has led to an account of 
subjectivity that creates "the problem of other minds." As a 
consequence, descriptions of moral communities have always 
had the anxiety of that problem hanging in the background. 
Merleau-Ponty offers an account of perceptual consciousness 
that avoids the problems that follow from the model of the 
interiorized subject. In turn, an account of the moral 
community must be given that does not have the anxiety of 
'the problem of the other' hanging in the background.
"Wittgenstein's Two Senses of 'Understanding'":
Wittgenstein contends in the Philosophical Investigations 
there are two senses of 'understanding': paraphrastic and 
intransitive understanding. The second, intransitive 
understanding, serves a special purpose in our lives— it 
pulls us out of our habitual and prejudicial ways of speaking 
and being. The only problem is that it creates new habits 
and prejudices, because we are tempted to think of our new 
ways of speaking as more accurate or better than the previous 
ones. Attempts to create a style of speaking that avoids 
this pitfall have not worked out (e.g., Heidegger), which 
leads us to a suspicion that style alone does not resist 
literalization. New styles of speaking must be coupled with 
a state of character that steels us to resist the temptations 
to make divinities of our ways of speaking.
"Plato's Meno and a Problem for Moral Education":
The Meno provides a model for moral education, but there are 
gaps in it. That is, the dialogue maps a progression a 
successful student makes, but being in one state is not a 
sufficient condition for the progression to the next state.
A student must come to see the goods internal to a life of 
excellence instead of pursuing excellence for the sake of 
external goods, and this transformation cannot be brought 
about by anyone but the student herself. The transformation 
comes out of nowhere— it cannot be conditioned. As a 
consequence, the most convenient manner of describing this 
change of character is as a question of grace. In turn, I 
contend the dialogue's conclusion is a gesture toward this 
problem.
Preface
These three essays are essays in ethics. All of them 
start off with relatively complex technical and 
epistemological issues, but ultimately boil down to a basic 
question: what sort of contributions do we want to make to
our moral and philosophical communities? In this reduction 
of technical and epistemological questions to ethical 
questions, I am hoping to draw attention to a simple idea. 
Namely, at the foundations of our systematics, we have 
certain powerful and compelling experiences that inform our 
intuitions of how the systematics should work. We catch 
glimpses of what we would like our lives to be, what we would 
like our institutions to be. They are landmarks by which we 
orient ourselves both as philosophers and as human beings.
We judge our lives and others' by these standards. What I 
see in common with these standards is the fact that we in our 
visions of the good life prefer spontaneity and dialogue to 
coersion and soliloquy. We see how we best get along with 
others, how our relationships are most fulfilling, how we 
resist the cultural homogeneity that seems to envelop and 
entrap even our best attempts to be genuine.
"Merleau-Ponty and the Dissolution of 'the Problem of 
the Other': a New Vision for Ethics" takes a similar tack by 
the fact in it I contend our ethics is colored by how we view
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otherness. When otherness must be constructed, our ethics 
are stiff. That is, we can describe how to act morally, but 
we cannot describe how we get along. Moreover, when 
otherness as other is unavailable— as Sartre would contend—  
our relations are fundamentally conflictual. However, if we 
construe otherness as something discovered in the world with 
us, we find an agreement between ourselves and others which 
must be prior to our social-contractual agreements. We can 
see how our moral intuitions are informed by how we fall into 
spontaneous rapport with others.
I try in "Wittgenstein's Two Senses of 'Understanding'" 
to describe the problems facing us when we reflect upon our 
moments of spontaneity— how when we priviledge the habit of 
particularly moving or compelling moments, we fall back into 
formulaic interactions with each other all over again. It is 
not that I am lamenting the fact that we seem not to be able 
to find a descriptive strategy that always avoids becoming 
entraping. However, I am looking into how we would have to 
live in order to avoid being captured by certain pictures of 
language, mind, or even the good life.
"Plato's Meno and a Problem for Moral Education" is an 
essay on the chasm between the necessary conditions for 
successful moral education and the sufficient conditions.
What Plato shows in the Meno is how, even though the value of 
pursuing inquiry in a friendly and conversational manner 
seems self-evident, people still miss it. They simply do not
V
see it. When we try to convince someone to take up a new 
manner or framework for investigations, we can show that 
person the new framework, compare it to the old framework, 
even train that person to make use of the framework. But we 
can never instill an appreciation for the framework itself in 
a person. Students must come to that appreciation by 
themselves. What a student must do is acknowledge her 
ignorance in a matter when shown she cannot provide an 
adequate account. Moreover, she must be willing to pursue 
the truth in the matter. But students fail to do even this. 
They are often unwilling to own up to the fact they do not 
know, and when they do acknowledge their ignorance, they are 
complacent with that ignorance. They, even though they see 
they do not know, feel no desire to come to know. However, 
when students make this transformation, from the teacher's 
perspective, it comes ex nihilo. That is, it seems that 
there is no sufficient condition for the transformation— it 
simply happens.
As a consequence, all of these essays involve a vision 
of a community that encourages its members to question its 
conventions and find new ways of speaking, yet also remains 
true to its project of bettering and educating its members. 
Even though real changes in character cannot be conditioned 
sufficintly, that community provides the necessary space for 
that transformation to take place. Much of what is actually 
said in these essays about such a community, however, is
vi
vague, but intentionally so. Once such an account begins to 
be explicit, it takes the form of a methodology or a set of 
rules, and once this happens,* the account becomes subject to 
its own criticisms— namely, that it, too, is a dogma. What I 
am trying to do with my account, then, is avoid the nostalgia 
of identifying with big and captivating ideas like Reason, 
Philosophy, Being, Truth, and the like, because such accounts 
begin to ring hollow once they get under way. What I can say 
at most is that the education and betterment these 
communities provide us is not only a healthy suspicion of 
such nostalgias, but a willingness to make do with them until 
we begin to bump our heads against their limits. What we do 
once we are at these limits is begin making forays into the 
unknown instead of mapping its borders.
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Merleau-Ponty's Dissolution of 'the Problem of the Other':
a New Vision for Ethics.
2
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The 'problem of the other' boils down to a simple 
question: do we consider ethics to be an individual private 
exercise or do we consider it to be a conversational public 
exercise? That is, when philosophers describe their 
relations with others, they reveal how they see the ethical 
community around them. They reveal how they relate to that 
community and its members. They reveal in what style they 
wish to enter into that community. In this paper, I will 
consider a few moments in the history of modern philosophy's 
engagement with 'the problem of the other' in order to show 
that philosophers have been biased toward considering ethics 
more in terms of soliloquy than dialogue. In his 
Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the 
Invisible, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, although he has difficulty 
overcoming the traditional model of the interiorized and 
private subject because he must engage it, offers a vision of 
ethics as conversation. This model demands to be developed, 
expanded, and tested. In turn, I provide a further model 
(antipodosis) for conversation wherein I try to articulate 
how by giving primacy to intersubjectivity, we can develop a 
new vision of ethics.
A. A short history of 'the problem of the other'
'The problem of the other' has been one of the more 
laughable topics of philosophical discussion. Most would
4
agree that when the conversation gets to the point where it 
is necessary to prove that others exist, the participants 
should smile politely to each other and instead of 
constructing an adequate proof, set to retracing their steps 
to see where they went so awry. This, unfortunately, has not 
always been the case.
1) Descartes problematizes the other.
Descartes sets the stage for the problem of the other 
specifically by the fact that he insists we know things (e.g. 
his famous piece of melting wax1) not by way of the senses 
but by way of the understanding alone. He maintains this 
because he demands that we be skeptical of the res extensa in 
the world (things available to perception), because they are 
constantly in flux. If these were the only things we could 
know, knowledge would be impossible. That is, if the only 
ways we can know wax as wax were by way of merely perceptual 
recognition, we could never be certain about what sorts of 
perceptual criteria we should use— because all of wax's 
qualities can change with a mere strike of a match. But on 
the other hand, when he "distinguishes the real wax from its 
superficial appearances, . . . and considers it naked, it is 
certain." 2
1 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. 
Lawrence Lafleur, in Philosophical Essays (New York: 
Macmillan, 1964) p. 88.
2 Ibid., p. 90.
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Descartes similarly problematizes knowledge of others by 
making the relation with an other a four-part relation: (i) 
myself as res cogitans, (ii) my body as res extensa, (iii) 
the other's body as res extensa, and (iv) the other as res 
cogitans. I am always quite sure of my self as res cogitans, 
but progressively less sure of the other things in the 
relation. This situation is the genesis of the 'problem of 
the other':
So I may chance look out a window and notice some 
men passing in the street, at the sight of whom I 
do not fail to say I see men, just as I say I see 
wax; and nevertheless what do I see from this 
window except hats and cloaks which might cover 
ghosts or automata which move only by springs? But 
I judge that they are men, solely by the faculty of 
judgment which resides in my mind, that which I 
believed I saw with my eyes.3
What is important here is the fact that he must judge that
these walking, talking, smiling, sniffling, and farting
entitites outside his window are people - that he must weigh
out the evidence, reflect on it, and offer a judgment. This
situation, especially in light of Descartes' methodological
solipsism later in the Meditations, can only be mediated by
the one entity outside ourselves that we cannot doubt—
namely, God. Since Descartes assures us that God exists and
would not deceive us, we can confidently judge the other to
exist.
2) Kant's ingenious argument
3 Ibid., p. 89, emphais mine.
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The venerable Kant also treats the 'problem of the 
other' as a problem of judgment, but does not rely on God's 
omniscience/omnipotence/infinite benificence to ground this 
judgment. Instead, Kant contends we can be sure of the 
other's existence by the use of our own faculties of pure 
reason which take the form of what we shall call the argument 
by analogy.
Kant, as Descartes had before him, considered the 
relation with the other to be four-part; (i) myself as 
subject, (ii) myself as object, (iii) the other as object and 
(iv) the other as subject. From this division, Kant's 
argument proceeds as such:
Pi: We must assign to objects, necessarily and a
priori, all the properties that constitute the 
conditions under which alone we can think them 
(i.e., objects must be subject to the 
categories for them to be available to a 
subject).
P2: We cannot have any representation whatsoever
of a thinking being, through any outer 
experience, but only through self 
consciousness (i.e., subjects are never 
subject to the categories— and so never 
available to other subjects).
Cl: Objects of this kind (thinking things) are,
therefore, nothing more than the transference 
of this consciousness of mine to other things, 
which in this way alone can be represented as 
thinking beings.4
Kant contends that the way thinking beings can meet the
4 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929) p. B.405 
(adapted as a proof).
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conditions of P2 for us is that we have to recognize the 
possibility of an existent exhibiting the properties 
applicable to its subject— which depends entirely on a 
transcendental employment of the understanding. And so as it 
would stand, for me to recognize an other as other would 
require me to lend her my subjectivity in my own reflection 
upon my relation with her. I could only hope that she would 
do the same for me— else it would end up rather degrading, 
because if she did not reflectively lend me her subjectivity,
I would be no more than a talking turnip to her. Certainly 
not an ideal conversational situation. Moreovoer, this 
"reflective transference of consciousness" is still a mystery 
— what exactly happens when we represent others as thinking 
beings instead of merely as automata? How, more clearly, do 
we decide to go from seeing the other as object to seeing the 
other as subject, and can we honestly say that this 
representation of the other is any more than a construct that 
I have produced all by myself?
3) Husserl and the argument by analogy
Edmund Husserl engages this question in its hardest form
5xn the fxfth meditatxon of hxs Cartesian Meditations. By way 
of his second epoche (the transecendental reduction), Husserl 
had restricted the transcendental ego "to the stream of its
5 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorian Cairns 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).
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pure conscious processes and the unities constituted by their 
actualities and potentialities. And indeed it is obvious 
that such unities are inseparable from the ego and therefore 
belong to its concreteness itself.'"6 Other egos, then, for me 
are "merely synthetic unities of possible verification in 
me," and consequently do not even count as others. In 
effect, Kant's argument by analogy has led us to a solipsism, 
because the other can only be for me as a representation 
created by my own self-reflection. Husserl thinks that he 
can not only salvage the other as other (as if others were 
really in peril of being sucked back into his head when he 
stopped reflecting on himself apprehending them as other) but 
also can salvage the argument by analogy which had made the 
whole situation problematic to begin with.
Husserl's second epoche is inteded to be a device by 
which our own particular 'ownness' in an intersubjective 
field can be investigated. What seems to be the case at 
first is that if everything is reduced to 'ownness', then the 
very possibility of describing otherness is precluded.
Husserl believes it is possible to get around this 
difficultly by pointing to what he calls "the noematic-ontic 
mode of givenness of the other."7 He takes this givenness to 
be the "transcendental clue" to unravel the mess 
methodological solipsism got him into by the fact that it is
5 Ibid., p. 89.
7 Ibid., p. 90.
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not that we find the other belonging to us, as something 
other constituted out of ownness, but rather as an otherness
Qexperienced as "thereness for me" in "empathy." It is from 
this lone clue that Husserl's phenomenological sleuth is to 
construct a "transcendental theory of experiencing something 
other."9
What the second epochs reveals as the stratum of 
experience uniquely my own is my body. It alone is "the 
only object 'in' which I 'rule and govern' immediately," and 
only within it I can bring to light myself as "animate 
organism (Leib) .10 Other bodies (Korper)— be they the books 
in a library, the football in a major bowl game, or even the 
bodies of other people— do not exhibit this unique 
belongingness to me. No matter how hard I try, they do not 
do my bidding instantaneously. They require some 
manipulation. But there is something special and uncanny 
about the bodies of the third kind— the bodies of other 
people. In our particular/peculiar ways of perceiving 
others' bodies, there is something extra given in their 
appresentation (our representation of a body wherein we not 
only are aware of the side we can see but also of what we 
cannot see)— namely, the fact that they too are Leib but in a 
way that the personal side of that animateness is 
unavailable. The other is animate in that we can engage in
8 Ibid., p. 92.
9 Ibid., p. 94.
10 Ibid., p. 114.
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all kinds of "harmonious behavior" that manifests itself as a 
concordance of expresssions, gestures, and postures such that 
we can share some realm of each others' lives. The other's 
body is "livingly present" to me.11
It is in this "community of monads" that "an intentional 
communion with something else [can] exist,"12 by way of our 
taking up specifically with the animate body made available 
to us by our commonalities. The last part of the analogy is 
merely that we recognize that as part of our bodily existence 
in relation to other bodies, our bodies will always be 
"Here," and other bodies will always be "There."
Consequently, in appresentation of the other, because 
animate-ness is reciprocally avalable, the other "must be 
appresented as an ego now coexisting in the mode there, ‘such
as I should be if I were there.'"13 I look at the other, 
then, as if I were standing inside her body— as an analogue 
to my own particular ownness.
But it seems that Husserl's dressing up of the argument 
by analogy does not get around the problem. He still keeps 
the situation a four-term relation in that there is: (i) my
ego as animate body, (ii) my body as objectively present 
body, (iii) the other's body as objectively present body, and 
(iv) the other's ego as animate body. Because the analogy is 
the replacement of (iv) with (i) in the form of "over there",
11 Ibid., p. 112.
12 Ibid., p. 129.
13 Ibid., p. 119.
11
Husserl has not made it clear how this argument by analogy 
avoids the paradox (if not outright absurdity) of describing 
otherness with ownness.
But these technical matters are not terribly pressing, 
because what Husserl has set up is a bafflingly rigorous 
description of how we appresent others to ourselves that, 
even if it did work (which is dubious), no one would take the 
time to actually deduce otherness for others with any 
regularity, because it would be a terrible hassle. In other 
words, Husserl has given a description of how the other is 
available to me, but it seems that it requires such a level 
of precision and attention, I would run out of mental energy 
deducing otherness from just taking a walk on a busy street.
Who would take the time to perform these elaborate mental-
14gymnastics every time she bumps into someone?
4) Sartre and concrete relations with others
Sartre is the most vocal of the phenomenologists who 
object to the unwieldiness of Husserl's laborious process of
14 In fact, this procedure begs the question: how de we know
when we've got our deductions right? How can we even go 
about learning or testing the accuracy of this procedure 
without others already being present to us? Husserl had 
contended that ego and alter-ego are "always and necessarily 
given in an original 'pairing'," but is this all that needs 
to be said? (Cartesian Meditations,112) Why, then must 
there be an argument? The very fact that Husserl does use 
the argument by analogy is indicative of how his 
methodological solipsism catches him in another loop— that it 
chips off what it must use as a toe-hold to climb out of the 
ego-well it has dug with the second epoche.
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bringing others to 'noematic-ontic givenness.' He contends
that Husserl's approach burdens consciousness with problems
of evidence and knowledge which deprive it of the essential
spontaneity that is revealed in investigations of
intentionality. Sartre wants to change the topics of inquiry
from epistemological issues to ontological issues because he
recognizes that:
if the other is accessible to us only by means of the 
knowledge we have of him, and if this knowledge is only 
conjectural, then the existence of the other is only 
conjectural.... If the body is a real object really 
acting on thinking substance, the other becomes a pure 
representation, whose esse is a simple percipi.15
When the connections I establish with others are construed to
be connections of knowledge, I can never escape solipsism,
because I can never prove or verify that my consciousness (as
a transcendental and constituting ego) can, in its very
being, be affected by any thing beyond the mundane (bodily)
existence of others.16
Sartre's turn to ontology in Being and Nothingness takes
the form of describing how we experience a change in the
landscape of our world when another person appears. This
phenomenon certainly demonstrates that the other's presence
as an objectively present body (and consequently as a
conjectural entity) is not all that is really happening— that
is, "it is infinitely more probable that the passerby whom I
15 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. 
Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956) p. 305.
16 Ibid., p. 318.
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17see is a man and not a perfected robot." I recognize that 
the other (as other) is not simply another part of a world I 
constitute for myself— rather, she is another locus or center 
around which the world can be organized (and is organized). 
But the most profound aspect of recognizing the other as a 
presence in person is in the moment, upon the other's 
appearance, of "being-seen-by-other18
The world is polarized with the other's appearance. 
Everything still exists for me, but seems fixed in a flight 
from me to another locus (the other), and when I recognize I 
occupy a position in that same world (with my body), I 
recognize that I too am in a flight to the other as a 
permanent possibility. I feel that the other can always be 
looking at me.19
The obvious question here is how does it happen? 
Certainly Sartre has shown that we are affected by others as 
more than their mere presence as objects, but we philosophers 
want to know how it happens. Sartre avoids the 'external' or 
'cognitive' relations between ourselves and others by 
claiming that the relation is "internal."20 He makes this 
evident with his description of how we react to the 
modification of the world (and our being) when the other 
comes on the scene— we feel shame, embarrasment, anger,
17 Ibid., p. 340.
18 Ibid., p. 345.
19 Ibid., p. 345.
20 Ibid., p. 221.
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pride, etc. In any one of these situations, the effect of my 
world's (and my) rearrangement is that I consider myself as 
an object for the other while the other is present to me as a 
subject. The other binds me to the 'facticity' of my past
and my situation such that "I am my ego for the other in the
2 1mrdst of a world that flows toward the other." Sartre
captures this feeling of being in the other's gaze (the
feeling that my being is transformed in the presence of the
other) in his famous description of the eavesdropper being
caught peeking though a keyhole:
[As I am looking through the keyhole], this situation 
reflects to me at once both my facticity and my 
freedom.... I cannot truly define myself as being in a 
situation; first because I am not a positional 
consciousness of myself; second because I am my own 
nothingness... I escape provisional definitions of 
myself by means of all my transcendence.22
I am engaged in the activity of looking. I am not reflecting
upon myself as something that knows (or is to be known),
rather I am the landmark by which the world makes sense and
the spectacle behind the door is disclosed. I exist as
myself for my pre-reflective consciousness.
But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall.
Someone is looking at me I What does this mean? It 
means that I am suddenly affected in my being and 
essential modifications appear in my structure - 
modifications which I can apprehend and fix conceptually 
by means of the reflective cogito.23
What makes the relation between others concrete (and i
21 Ibid., p. 380.
22 Ibid., p. 348.
23 Ibid., p. 349.
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nternal), then, is not the fact that I see others by way of 
looking at myself, but that I see myself when somebody else 
sees me. It is with the presence of others that we suddenly 
have our attention reflected directly upon ourselves.
But the other can be under my gaze too. I can return 
the gaze and transform the other into an in-itself, strip her 
of transcendence, fix her in a situation, spatialize and 
temporalize her. Because of the nature of Sartre's 
description of the 'internal relation', the other and I 
maintain a mutual denial and nihilation, our relation is 
fundamentally conflictual. We find ourselves in a duel of 
gazes.
The implications here are profound. Once we come to 
some connection with the other (by way of language, facial 
expression, dismissive gesture, whatever), we learn what the 
other thinks of us, and "this is the thing which will be able
24to at once fascinate us and fill us with horror." We find 
ourselves offered up to the other's judgment, and in that act 
of judgment we come to a determination of how we see 
ourselves and in turn, act. Whether or not we agree with the 
other's judgment, the way we will carry on will be informed 
by the judgment. We confront a world organized by the other, 
and we find that we are no longer masters of our own 
situation— the other determines how we use our own freedom.
As a consequence, we have two choices. We can be:
24 Ibid., p. 355.
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a), the masochist, who causes herself to be fascinated 
by herself as an object determined (in its facticity) by 
the other, a being who condemns herself to trying to 
annihilate her own subjectivity by causing it to be 
assimilated by the other.25
or b), the sadist, who looks at the other's look and
attempts, on the ground of her own freedom, to confront 
the other's freedom, who turns the gaze back on the 
other such that the other cannot touch her.26
Because the other's presence reveals the being which I am
unable to either control or appropriate (since it is the
other's judgment), it is necessary for me to choose how I am
to respond, because I must respond. "From the moment I exist
I establish a factual limit to the other's freedom, I am
this limit, and each of my projects outline this limit around
27the other," and vice versa. Consequently, "respect for the
other's freedom is an empty word," because in either choice
(a) or (b), the other is a means to my end of becoming the
2 8self that I wish to be. In the case of (a), the masochist, 
the other serves merely as someone who can choose my projects 
for me and as the person in whom I can (for a while) situate 
my responsibilities. In the case of (b), the sadist, the 
other services me as a possession whose freedom I determine. 
Sartre points out that these two tactics are ultimately self- 
defeating in that the masochist can never erase her freedom 
by giving herself over to the other, and the sadist can never 
possess the other as other, because once the other becomes a
25 Ibid., p. 493.
26 Ibid., p. 494.
27 Ibid., p. 530.
28 Ibid., p. 531.
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possession, she ceases to be an other. So with each failure 
of one tactic, I am motivated to adopt the other one. 
Consequently, my relations with others individually may be 
dialectical (as a struggle over mastership and bondage), but
29my relations with others in general are circular.
Klaus Hartmann notes that "for Sartre, negation and 
negatedness, answering to subject and object, constitute a 
contradictory opposition."30 As a consequence, recognizing 
myself in the other (e.g., in the argument by analogy) 
requires a contradiction— that the subject be available to 
itself as an object, or that in the object a subject has 
access to itself qua subject. It is in this strict 
bipolarity that Hartmann situates the antagonism between 
individual subjects which makes it impossible to have access 
to the other as a subjectivity or even to recognize oneself 
in the other.31 As a result, Sartre's description of concrete 
relations with others leaves us locked up inside ourselves in 
a struggle of gazes with every other person we encounter. 
Moreover, since the original relationship with the other (in 
general) is that of internal negation (situating an object 
within a field of reference), it seems that Sartre would 
contend that we could be certain of others in general, but we 
have no way of being certain of individual others— we do not
29 Ibid., p. 474.
30 Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology (Evanston: Northwestern 
U. Press, 1966) p.115.
31 Ibid., p. 116.
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know anything about particular others as others.
Consequently, even our most intimate relations with others 
manifest the subject's antagonism for the object— "even the 
beloved is a look."32
B. Merleau - Ponty's dissolution of the problem
Accounts of otherness as a problem stem from modern 
philosophy's retreat to the internality of the subject— a 
retreat to the certainty available in statements about one's 
own mind. The only problem is that once we have retreated to 
certainty, we are reluctant to accept anything else except 
things mediated by the certain. The result is that things, 
others, and even ourselves become representations for us.
They become things we must construct. What philosophy 
becomes, then, is a very intricate talking to oneself.
Others, even in the most intense and honest joint inquiry, 
love affair, or conversation, become either conjectural 
'that's-what-I-would-say-were-I-over-there' entities or 
entities who must be subjugated by my use of language.
1) Breaking with the traditional model
Descartes' model for philosophy demands that the 
philosopher proceed directly from the mind's interiority to 
the exteriority of the world. Merleau-Ponty believed it was
32 Sartre, op. cit., p. 484.
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necessary to reformulate the arguments and problems
promulgated by such methodologies- In a note written a year
before his death, he outlines his revisions:
Replace the notions of concept, idea, representation 
with the notions of dimensions, articulation, level, 
hinges, pivots, configuration —  The point of departure 
= the critique of the usual conception of the thing and 
its properties -> critique of the logical notion of the 
subject, and of logical inference ..„.33
With this new theoretical impetus, Merleau-Ponty hoped to
develop a descriptive strategy that gives primacy neither to
the internality of consciousness nor rests on a distinction
between subject and object. In fact, he hoped to articulate
an ontology that elaborated notions that would dissolve the
traditional tensions between subjects and objects, subjects
and subjects, humankind and humans. The traditional
accounts make such notions their bread and butter, and in
turn, all suffer from the same problems— the problem of the
external world, the problem of the other, the problem of
individual consciousnesses. Phenomenology, especially with
Husserl and Sartre, was an acceleration of these attitudes to
the point where they were actually starting points for
systematics (as Sartre had used the tension between subjects
as the point of departure for his description of concrete
relations with others). Ethics, in turn, suffered from
distinct inadequacies, because its injunctions (when taken to
33 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. 
Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern 
U. Press, 1968) p. 224.
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be in accord with and influenced by epistemology) were 
tantamount to treating others as conjectural entities. 
Descartes had insisted we not allow our wills to extend
34beyond our understanding. Kant's internalized subject's 
criterion for proper action is that the action is out of good 
will, but he admits that because the subject is interiorized,
35we cannot even see good will. As a result, we are unable to 
get to the other about whom and for whom we are trying to 
describe ethical behaviour.
Merleau-Ponty had a very different vision of how things 
hang together, and he saw much of his picture nascent in
3 6Husserl's description of intentionality. Husserl had 
contended that the ego does not merely think; it thinks about 
something. Consciousness is not simply consciousness; it is 
consciousness of something. Here, consciousness constitutes 
a meaningful world for itself through a series of continuous 
and commensurate judgments, definitions, attitudes, and 
activities. Husserl (and Merleau-Ponty) referred to this 
contiguousness of intention as intentionality of act. For 
Merleau-Ponty, however, what is missing in this description 
is a deeper intentionality— an intentionality of lived bodily 
existence "where the world is not merely a blank slate
34 Descartes, op. cit., pp. 114-6.
35 Immanuel Kant, Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
trans. L.W. Beck (Saddle River, NJs Prentice Hall, 1995) p. 
397.
36 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. 
Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962) p. xviii, 243.
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awaiting bestowal of significance, but already has a 
distincitive physiognomy."37 He referred to deeper level of 
intentionality and significance as operative intentionality.
Merleau-Ponty contends in The Phenomenology of 
Perception that only by way of this broadened notion of 
intentionality we can understand "the natural and ante- 
predicative unity of the world and of our life, being 
apparent in our desires, our evaluations, and in the 
landscape we see, more clearly than in objective knowledge, 
and in furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to
3 8translate into a precise language." When operative 
intentionality is ignored, the world only reveals itself 
through a history to be reflected upon or essences to be 
analyzed. Here, in the historical-analytical reflection, our 
primary encounter with the world of things (in operative 
intentionality) is withheld in favor of breaking up 
perception into qualities and sensations. We depart from our 
pre-reflective origins. Here, we are tempted to think of 
ourselves as subjects or transcendental unities of 
apperception and the like. As a consequence, others become 
problems for us because we cannot adequately represent them 
as concatenations of sensations. But Merleau-Ponty is not 
leveling a philippic against analytic reflection;
37 James Schmidt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Between 
Phenomenology and Structuralism (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1985) p. 41.
38 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 
xviii.
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rationality, subjectivity and objectivity are not problems
39for him. Rather, he is reminding philosophers of their pre- 
reflective origins, and by this reminder, he hopes to suggest 
a new account of being-in-the-world; "true philosophy
40consxsts m  re-learning to look at the world."
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is an 
attempt to call attention to our existence as incarnate 
subjects inhering in the world, and the crucial term for this 
inherence is the body. Merleau-Ponty introduces us to a 
subjectless subject— a subject which cannot pull itself out 
of the world to contemplate itself or the world in isolated 
reflection. When we look closely at objects, we find they 
exist only in contextual lived realities. These contexts are 
not constituted by autonomous intellectual reflections and 
judgments, but by motor responses, practical spaces and body 
dynamics. "The synthesis of the object is effected through 
the synthesis of one's own body, it is the reply or
41correlative to it." By conceiving of my body itself as a 
mobile object, I am able to interpret perceptual appearances 
and construct them as they are (e.g., the apperception of all 
six sides of a cube is given not because I have Euclidean 
intuitions of space, but because I do things with cubes— I 
roll dice, pack boxes, play 3-D Tetris). Consequently, 
neither my body nor the world my body lives in can be
39 Ibid., p. xx.
40 Ibid., p. xx.
41 Ibid., p. 205.
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comprehended in isolation. Neither term is reducible to the 
other.
As a result, personal existence is fraught with 
ambiguity, uncertainty, and obscurity. Pre-reflective 
existence (that of the 'customary body' or the 'habitual 
body') opens onto a realm of existence that is not 
exhaustible by reflection, because it is rooted within a 
motor-physiognomy that can never be wholly disclosed. My 
body's familiarity with the world goes all the way down— I 
can never exfoliate my latent, tacit, bodily knowledge fully. 
Even our most mundane and simple practices resist being 
disclosed in their entirety; we have to live them, be trained 
to act within them (e.g.. the act of kicking a soccer ball 
becomes more and more difficult to describe— and the 
description becomes less and less clear— as we try to 
articulate the multiplicity of movements necessary for the 
execution of an adequate kick, but yet we still know how to 
give soccer balls good kicks without having to rely on such 
runaway analysis).
Because we reside in bodies, we cannot completely 
clarify our positions; we eventually have to rely on the 
intutitive, practical, public self-evidence of the limits of 
our accounts. But what we take to be self-evident in these 
accounts is inconstant. It is only made constant by a 
certain training or acclimation to specific situations. 
Merleau-Ponty gives an example pf how we gear ourselves into
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different lighting situations:
Electric lighting, which appears yellow immediately upon 
leaving the daylight, soon ceases to have any definite 
color for us, and, if some remnant of daylight finds its 
way into the room it is this 'objectively neutral' light
which seems to have a blue tint to it  The level is
laid down [for a particular situation], and with it all 
the color values dependent on it, as soon as we begin to 
live in the prevailing atmosphere and re-allot to 
objects the colors of this spectrum in accordance with 
the requirements of this basic convention.42
Bodily intentionality reveals how we gear ourselves into
situations, perceive and react to concatenations of objects—
we are invariably open-ended. instead of positing a single
space as the necessary condition for objects in general (as
Kant does with the transcendental deduction of the
categories), Merleau-Ponty draws our attention to the lived
and practical spatiality which is inseverable from our
experience of qualtities as particular modes of being-in-the-
world. As Monika Langer notes, "the sensible beckons to the
incarnate subject and the latter responds by shaping
43existence accordingly."
As a consequence of the ambiguity and opaqueness of pre- 
ref lective existence, the very attempt to establish a realm 
of pure thought, pure reason, or pure subjectivity as an 
indubitable ground for all knowledge seems backwards (if not 
outright impossible). Such attempts to establish the 
absolute interiority of the subject seem to be in defiance of
42 Ibid., p. 311.
43 Monika Langer, Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of 
Perception: A Guide and Commentary (Tallahassee: Florida St. 
U. Press, 1989) p. 311.
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the fact that all 'inner' states, reflective moments, and 
subjective judgments are always and everywhere based in, 
derived from, and reducible to pre-reflective 'outer'
44states. That is, for reflection to even be possible, we 
must first exist as beings-in-the-worId; we must be something 
to be reflected. As a consequence, we do not reduce 
existence to thoughts about existence (judgments, thetic 
moments, etc.); instead, thought is re-integrated with our 
total project of being-in-the-world.
2) Dissolving 'the problem of the other'
In the chapter 'Other People and the Human World' of The
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleay-Ponty considers "how I 
experience my own cultural world, my own civilization, that 
is, how other subjectivities make their appearance in 
experience." He notes that the traditional reply has been 
that "I interpret their behaviour by analogy with my own," 
but I run into a serious problem - "how can the word 'I' be 
put into the plural, how can a genearal idea of I be formed,
45how can I know there are other I's?" He puts his finger on
the paradox of consciousness seen from the outside:
If subjectivity is reduced to mind— or constituting
44 Monika Langer puts it best when she says that the 
theoretical disposition to demand the interiority of the 
subject "is not only an untenable position but also a 
dishonest one, insofar as it always already surreptitiously 
presupposes that which it attempts to deny." (p.99)
45 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.
348.
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consciousness— then the existence of any subjectivity 
other than one's own becomes utterly incomprehensible.46
If one consciousness posits other consciousnesses, it has
rendered them dependent by making their esse their percipi.
Moreover, (and Sartre sees this too) the subject cannot even
constitute another as subject because it would be a
contradiction for the subject to make itself an object for
itself (that is, the logical notion of the subject is that it
can never be an object). Consequently, self-perception
cannot be the starting point for an account of other minds.
(Here is where Sartre stumbles, because he contends that we
know of the other because of an internal relation we
establish with ourselves when the other comes on the scene—
that is, we know the other's awareness of us because we come
to reflect upon ourselves.) So, "insofar as I constitute the
47world, I cannot conceive another consciousness."
Merleau-Ponty's break with the traditional conception of
consciousness offers a way out. Because the problem of other
minds had been generated by the model of the internal,
occult, and mysterious mind, the problem could never come to
a solution. But Merleau-Ponty's account of consciousness is
not as a constituting consciousness, but rather:
as perceptual consciousness, as the subject of a pattern 
of behaviour, as being-in-the-world or existence, for 
only thus can another appear at the top of his 
phenomenal body, and be endowed with a sort of 
'locality'. Under these conditions the antinomies of 
objective thought vanish. I discover vision, not as a
46 Langer, op. cit., p.98.
47 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.
350.
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'thinking about seeing', to use Descartes' expression, 
but as a gaze at grips with a visible world, and that is
why there can be another's gaze; that expressive
insturment called a face can carry an existence, as my 
own existence is carried by my body, that knowledge- 
acquiring apparatus.48
As a result of this turn, we do not see intentions as mental
entities independent of mechanistic bodies (as ghosts in
machines). Rather, bodily intentionality resides in our
body's activities, it "speaks to" other phenomenal bodies and
is comprehended by them prior to any reflection on either
side. There is actually no need for an analogy here.
Significance for me is in fact intersubjective significance.
The other appears at the other end of interaction "as the
49completion of the system." That is, there is a mutual 
presence of incarnate subjects which precedes any reflection, 
alienation, or negation. The system the other completes 
takes the form of a cultural practice— a system of 
communication where "as the parts of my body together 
comprise a system, so my body and the other person's are one 
whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon."50 As we 
appropriate certain cultural objects and use them as others 
do (that is, as we learn and master more and more expressive 
mediums— from painting to skating, from writing love letters 
to waving hello), we project ourselves into an environment of 
interaction and communication.
Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is one particular
48 Ibid., p. 351, emphasis mine.
49 Ibid., p. 352.
50 Ibid., p. 354.
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cultural object that plays a crucial role in the perception 
of the other: language. In dialogue, the other and I not 
only share a common ground, but we create that common ground 
together. "My thoughts and his are interwoven into a single 
fabric.... Here we have a dual being, where the other is for 
me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental 
field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in 
commensurable reciprocity."51 As Merleau-Ponty had pointed 
out earlier, the linguistic gesture delineates its own 
meaning. Words and speech are not codes for thought. "Why 
should thought seek to duplicate itself or clothe itself in a 
succession of utterances, if the latter do not carry and
52contain within themselves their own meaning?" That is, 
speech possesses a power and significance of its own— thought 
and expression are simultaneously constituted. Meaning is 
not indexical, then, it must be diacritical. When I am in 
dialogue with an other, we are not engaged in an exchange of 
mental images mediated by a code of sounds and gestures; 
instead, we are thinking out loud together. When I am faced 
with an angry or threatening gesture, I do not need to 
reflect upon my compendium of past experiences with anger to 
situate the angry gesture as meaning the person is angry. I 
do not see the anger or threatening attitude as a mental or 
psychic fact behind the phenomenal gesture. The angry
51 Ibid., p. 354.
52 Ibid., p. 182.
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gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself. 
Consequently, cultural objects— the institution of language 
most notably, but also music, painting, and bodily postures—  
allow others to be perspicuous for me (and me for others).
But this perspicuity is not of the kind where I can see into 
the other's head and see her anger. On the contrary, because 
Merleau-Ponty had insisted that language consists of use 
value instead of signification, it does not matter how we 
represent the other for ourselves, but how we respond to her 
being angry. "Each [gesture] by itself has no signifying 
power that one can isolate, and yet, when they are joined 
together in speech or, as it is called, the verbal chain,
54 . . .they all make unquestionable sense." We inhabit linguistic 
spheres where words are gestures with lived value, where they 
fit together with a naturalness that cannot be captured 
except by those gestures in those orders. (Merleau-Ponty 
notes that the novelist, artist, and musician assemble 
gestures in a similar manner— the novelist's task is to 
depict inter-human events that resonate with living
. 55meanings.)
Sartre's description of dialogue, on the other hand, 
amounts to it being a continuation of conflict and reversal
53 Ibid., p. 184.
54 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Science and the Experience of 
Expression," in The Prose of the World, ed. Claude Lefort, 
trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Notrhtwestern U. Press, 1973)
p. 28.
55 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.
151.
30
of alienation by other means. Speaking for Sartre is another 
form of seduction of the other.56 Merleau-Ponty, however, 
contends that learning to speak is not simply the mastering 
of a new intellectual faculty, but the acquisition of a new 
and powerful capacity to live with others not as the center 
of the world, but as a de-centered self— one that is in a 
situation where "we encroach upon one another inasmuch as we 
belong to the same cultural world, and above all to the same 
language, and my acts of expression and the other's derive 
from the same institution."57 In speech, we graft onto one 
another such that mutual recognition need not be given 
because intersubjectivity enjoys a primacy that it would make 
no sense to even question.
3) 'Flesh' and the handshake
In The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty makes 
it clear that it is impossible to do justice to the 
phenomenon of otherness from within an ontology of 
transcendentalism, subjectivism, or dialecticalism. We can 
never describe otherness with ownness. However, he later 
realized that his own account of otherness in The 
Phenomenology of Perception suffered from a very serious 
problem: his notion of the body leaves it entirely unclear
56 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 372-4
57 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Dialogue and the Perception of the 
Other," in The Prose of the world, ed. Claude Lefort, trans 
John O'Neill (Evanston: Notrhtwestern U. Press, 1973) p. 139.
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how the perceiver is simultaneously part of the percieved 
world and sufficiently apart from it for a dialogue between 
them to arise. The body in The Phenomenology of Perception 
was to be an incarnation of habitual pre-reflectivity. It 
functioned (as it did for Sartre as the pre-reflective 
cogito) as the pole of the touchable— that to be perceived 
and reflected upon. Consciousness, on the other hand, 
functions as the reflective pole, the side that gives voice 
to the 'world of silence' that pre-reflective bodily 
existence provides for it. But, in The Visible and the 
Invisible, Merleau-Ponty reconsiders the coherence of the
5 8very notion of a pre-reflective cogito.
What I call the tacit cogito is impossible. To have the 
idea of 'thinking' ..., to make the 'reduction', to 
return to immanence and to consciousness of ... , it is 
necessary to have words. It is by the combination of 
words ... that I form the transcendental attitude, that 
I constitute the constitutive consciousness. The words 
do not refer to positive significations and finally to 
the flux of Erlebnisse (experiences) as Selbstgegeben 
(self-evident). Mythology of a self-consciousness to 
which the word 'consciousness' would refer —  there are 
only differences between significations.59
Pre-reflection and reflection are themselves cultural and
grammatical artifacts— it is not that the artifacts of
grammar are created by them. So describing interaction with
the other in terms of bodily pre-reflection still falls prey
to the problem of describing othernes with ownness. As a
consequence, Merleau-Ponty found it necessary to come up with
58 James Schmidt, op.cit., p. 94.
59 Maurice Mereau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 
171, emphasis mine.
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a new description of how we can both touch and be touched 
without having recourse to the notion of the body as a pre- 
ref lective cogito. That is, he must describe a neutral 
medium in which ownness and otherness can meet without 
contradiction.
In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty uses the 
notion of 'flesh' as a 'prototype of being', a mediator 
between the body as being a part of and the body as being 
apart from the world. Vision adheres to the visible, 
perception adheres to the perceptible. It is the eye that 
sees, not the soul. We, as seers, are visibles— we are 
reversible. "It is that the thickness of the flesh between 
seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its 
visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an
60obstacle between them, xt xs thexr means of communxcatxon." 
Flesh exists as the synergy between the seer and the seen, 
but it itself remains unseen— it must remain the other side, 
the obverse, of sensible being. By way of the flesh, we can 
overcome the paradox of difference and sameness, self and 
other, ipseity and alterity. That is, any account of the 
other or the object must include a mixing of identity with 
difference— difference, because the other must be genuinely 
other (not me); and identity, because the other must be 
disclosed as something that I can recognize as analogous to
60 Ibid., p. 135.
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61myself. Flesh provides the common ground where the other
and I can reach each other— where I can see and be seen— but
also where we can be opaque to each other to maintain our
6 2specific identities. Otherness must be discovered within 
this ground. The other must make herself known to me (as the 
paradoxically same and different). If the other is a meaning 
or significance I can project upon some discernable body, 
then that body is not truly another's, I would manufacture 
the other.63
What Merleau-Ponty's idea of 'flesh' boils down to 
is a question of mediation. Flesh is the "third thing" in 
the subject-object and subject-subject dialectic. 
Traditionally, it was thought that for such a dialectic to 
get under way, the third entity in mediation must originate 
from one of the two poles in the dialectic. However, when we 
actually go about describing how the subject goes about 
producing the mediator, we fall into idealism (or 
intellectualism), where everything is reducible to "ownness."
61 Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories is an 
attempt to do this very thing, but with objects in general. 
The schemata were to be the mediators between the subject and 
the object - in that the categories were to be indicative of 
'belongingness to the subject' and their 'reference' were to 
be indicative of their difference. This, of course, does not 
work, because reference cannot be given but by way of another 
superaddition of the categories to a judgment. As a 
consequence, Kant's critical philosophy spawned a 
proliferation of what can be called 'internal philosophy'.
62 M. C. Dillon, "Ecart: Reply to Lefort's 'Flesh and 
Otherness'," in Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, ed. 
Galen Johnson and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern U. 
Press, 1990) p. 16.
63 Ibid., p. 17.
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On the other hand, when the object is the source of 
mediation, the subject has no ownness— no pattern is more
64recognizable than any other. The way "flesh" works 
mediately, then, is in no such manner. It itself is 
anonymous— neither bearing the stamp of the subject nor of 
the object. Merleau-Ponty's objection to the dialectical 
dogma of mediation springing from the poles is that for the 
relations between the poles to even be possible, it must 
already be established.65 The object, then, is not 
constructed, intuited, or represented in the subject but is 
discovered in a neutral space.
The question still remains: what exactly happens when 
we discover otherness? Merleau-Ponty provides an example - a 
model of reversability: the handshake. Flesh is the medium
of reversability— the third term in the doubling back of the 
relation between the touching hand and the touched hand. The 
body is capable of seeing, touching, and hearing itself, and 
in fact, the gaze can detatch from the subject and turn back 
upon itself as if it came out of the things seen.66 So, in 
the handshake, "I can feel myself touched as well and at the 
same time as touching"— there is no problem with the alter
64 Cf. Merleau-Ponty's description of the inadequacy of 
intellectualist and physiologist descriptions of sensation in 
Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 3-25.
65 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp.
77,87,93.
66 Claude Lefort, "Flesh and Otherness," in Ontology and 
Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, ed. Galen Johnson and Michael B. 
Smith (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1990) p. 7.
because it is not I who sees (touches), not he who sees 
(touches) because an anonymous visibility (touchability) 
inhabits us both in virtue of that primordial property 
that belongs to the flesh, being here and now, of 
radiating everywhere and forever, being an individual, 
of being a dimension and a universal.67
In the circle of the touched and the touching, the touched
takes hold of the touching— the touched inscribes itself in 
6 8the touching. When we see other people, we do not look at 
them with pupil-less eyes; we designate our place among 
others as a visible, with seeable eyes. It is here that I 
understand the other's transcendence— not because I grasp the 
other as a transcendent entity (as a subject, consciousness, 
mind, res cogitans, whatever), but because the other and I 
dance around the flesh. Instead of an abyss that separates 
us, a joining of two sides of a dance links us. We must both 
be "abstracts from one sole tissue."69 Our relationship is 
not that of two contradictories (as with a dialectic), but 
rather as two entries into the same being, two different 
moments in the same syntax, reverses of each other.
Of course I can never have the other's experiences, but 
this does not put us at odds— nor does that make her
7 Qinaccessable. This non-coincidence is manifest even xn the 
non-coincidence of touching and touched. That is, the 
touched can never touch the touching, but it does bind it,
67 Maurice Mereau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.
142
68 Ibid., p. 143.
69 Ibid., p. 262.
70 James Schmidt, op. cit., p. 96 .
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inscribe itself in it. What the touching is, then, is not a 
problem. What the other is, then, is not a problem.
Claude Lefort criticizes Merleau-Ponty for insisting 
that the phenomenon of reversibility discloses otherness. 
Lefort contends that by doing so, Merleau-Ponty ignores the
71irreducibility of otherness. But as both M.C. Dillon and 
Gary Brent Madison contend in their responses to Lefort's 
essay, Merleau-Ponty's use of the notion of 'flesh' allows 
for otherness to remain irreducible, but no longer 
mysterious. Madison contends that flesh allows the subject 
to be for itself an other, but as Dillon anticipates (and as 
I have shown earlier), this does not allow the other to be 
discovered. For Madison, the other would be merely another 
production were this so. That is, Madison's account of how 
otherness is available is that it is an "internal 
phenomenon," but he insists that it is not an "internal 
projection." Instead, he contends that "when I engage in 
reflection, I am already for myself an other. Because of
7 2this, otherness is inscribed in my very flesh." However, 
Madison's account seems to work in denial of the facts that
71 (Lefort, op. cit., p.8) Lefort also criticizes Merleau- 
Ponty for not having made it clear how cultural practices 
come about - that the Being Merleau-Ponty actually 
investigated was not that wild experience he had hoped to 
give expression, but was already domesticated for him (p.11). 
However, this issue goes too far afield for the purposes of 
this essay.
72 Gary Brent Madison, "Flesh as Otherness," printed in 
Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty. ed. Galen Johnson and 
Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1990) p. 
33.
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Merleau-Ponty had pointed out that: (1) 'other within the 
self' maneouvres are commensurate with the pre-reflective 
cogito, which he had repudiated, and (2) any account of 
otherness that is derived internally is nothing more than a 
dressing up of the argument by analogy.
C. Conversational ethics
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology discloses how we are 
geared into a bodily order (logos) which is already 
intersubjective, already informed by mutual recognitions. As 
a consequence, we can appreciate the otherness of the other 
with more acuity. We can articulate and explore the 
ambiguities of our relations with others— not so that they 
will suddenly become unambiguous but so that we can be more 
sensitive to and cognizant of the necessity for ambiguity and 
reversability in our relations with others. As David Michael 
Levin notes, here, in these hinges of relations with others, 
in "the intertwinings, transpositions, and reversabilities 
taking place in the dimension of our intercorporeality..., 
the body's deeply felt sense of justice [is brought to
73light ] ." What philosophers should do now that our
discussions of relations between ourselves and others can be
informed by Merleau-Ponty's new model is make use of it in
73 David Michael Levin, "Justice in the Flesh," in Ontology 
and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, ed. Galen Johnson and Michael 
B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1990) p. 35.
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new situations, investigate what might be disclosed about an
ethics that works silently between our bodies.
Our sense of justice is deeply rooted, firmly grounded 
in the body of our experience. There is a preliminary 
sense of justice already schematized in and by the 
flesh: this sense is a political ideality, a logos,
which gives the flesh its ethical and political axis; 
its sense is an implicit logos which already lays down, 
for our intercorporeality, a direction for further 
exertions, and gathers us into forms of communication by 
which we can extend its enlightening rule.74
Levin suggests that we ask the question: what kind of society
do our bodies require? He suggests that "given the fact that
the order of our bodies is an order structured by
reversibility, what the body needs for its fulfillment is a
social order governed by instituitions of reciprocity."75 In
fact, many of the current (instead of ideal as Levin
suggests) social institutions can be described in terms of
bodily relations.76 My project in this paper is not nearly as
ambitious, but is of importance. I intend to use Merleau-
Ponty' s model of the reversability of the handshake to inform
a description of how we maintain the informal institution of
the personal relationship— how we get along as individuals.
It only makes sense that a new ethics should be brought about
when a new ontology has been articulated.
Because "flesh" exists as an anonymous mediation between
74 Ibid., p. 43.
75 Maurice Mereau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 
43.
76 Deleuze and Guattari's parallels between capitalist 
production and bodily (both erotic and ergonomic) production 
is the most obvious example.
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subjects, an account of how subjects get along should take 
account of this anonymity's influence on how those subjects 
make rules for their interaction. That is, because 
traditional theories of ethics have relied on the mediation 
coming from either the subject or the object, they make 
injunctions about what kind of rules should be made. But 
once we recognize that we encounter others in a world 
constituted by neither of us, we see from where our moral 
intuitions arise. That is, our utopian visions, moral fibre, 
ethical hope, and appreciation for the virtues are informed 
by moments we have with others that are not constructed with 
rules and principles but ones where we come together 
spontaneously.
1) Imperativity, interrogativity, and reciprocity
The point of coming into contact with another person—  
whether it be a stranger who sits next to me on the bus or a 
good friend who just has entered the room— is the point where 
I come into communication with that other person. We open an 
expressive space. In the case of the stranger on the bus, I 
at least make some sort of gesture that acknowledges her 
presence— I move over to give her some space to sit; I may 
make some sort of greeting nod. These gestures are not 
necessary (in that they are not the only communicative 
gestures that can be used), but some gesture is necessary. 
Even refusing to make a greeting gesture (i.e., not even
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acknowledging the other person sitting right next to me) is a 
gesture in that it speaks to the other person— it tells her 
that I refuse to even acknowledge her (isn't that enough?).
In this case, she can either comply (she can ignore me too, 
and we can be in agreement), or she can respond by trying 
harder to engage me— which usually leads to some dismissive 
gesture on my part or an outright rebuff. Either way, I set 
the tone for the expressive space between us. We don't have 
to speak, but the longer the trip, the more uneasy we become 
with the silence.77 In the case of my friend coming into the 
room, we greet each other with each other's names, maybe a 
pat on the back, or an exchange of familiar expressions. We 
allow conversation to flow; our posture is toward one another 
such that we can pick up on how the other is reacting; we 
explore each other's affectations. At some time, I may 
happen upon my friend when she is distraught or angry, and I 
can only respond by listening to her, by trying to comfort 
her, or trying to take her side— there is no letting the 
conversation flow where it may here.
What these examples ammount to is this: when we enter
into communication with others, we make gestures of opening
the expressive space such that we can either come into a
77 I once sat next to a woman on a plane from Detroit to San 
Fransisco for 5 hours. She refused even to look at me for 
the entire trip, and it began to bother me, because it 
required such a concerted effort on her part not even to 
respond to the most basic of overtures - looking at me, the 
obligatory smile, sitting in her seat like there was some one 
sitting next to her, etc.
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dialogue of determining what or how to communicate, or one of 
us makes a demand that the communicative space be a certain 
way. The person who refuses to speak to me on the bus and 
the distraught friend make imperative gestures to me— they 
alone determine the mood of the communication, the topic of 
discourse, our project together (even if it is the absence of 
a project as it is when I am rude to the woman on the bus). 
The person who responds to my presence on the bus and the 
friend who is open to conversation with me (be it idle talk 
or dialogue) make interrogative gestures to me— they open the 
expressive space such that we can decide together what the 
topic of conversation and the mood of the communication will 
be. We treat each other as the ends of the communication—  
not the extraction or exchange of information, expression of 
some feeling, or sense of satisfaction from having 
accomplished something.
The response to the imperative gesture is contained in 
the imperative gesture itself. The other's behaviour in 
response to the gesture is preordained by the gesture; that 
is, the other either complies or rejects entering into the 
communicative space altogether. In either case, both parties 
have their roles unambiguously determined until the project 
is brought to fruition. Both parties crystalize for each 
other. The one who makes the demand polices the interaction; 
she makes sure we do not change the topic of conversation 
until she is satisfied. In the case of the silent stranger
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on the bus, my compliance is that I do not open some 
communicative space, but our proximity on the bus (the fact 
that we sit right next to each other) requires that I 
continually re-comply (that is, any moment my eyes drift near 
her or when a bump knocks our shoulders together requires 
that I again comply with her demand that we not enter into 
any more communication than our agreement not to 
communicate). In the case of my distraught friend, my 
compliance is my reacting with sympathy, lending her my ear, 
letting her vent until she feels better, or at least until 
she wears herself out. My rejection would take the form of 
changing the subject (another imperative gesture, saying 
generally 'I don't want to talk about that, but this, 
however, I will talk about') or of refusing to be 
sympathetic, refusing to allow her to expect me to react in 
any manner. In any of these cases, my intentional field (my 
choices for action) is restricted; I must react to the 
imperative gesture in certain ways— someone else situates me 
in a certain syntax.
In any of these cases, the person making the imperative 
gesture demands that I fulfill her expectations, play a 
certain structured role for her, do what is appropriate, and 
it is in this demand that I become distanced from the other. 
Not because I am alienated by the fact that I have something 
forced upon me (although this does happen, it is not the 
ontologically distancing aspect of this gesture). Instead, I
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am distanced from the other because the other demands that we 
step into a structure that generalizes me, that makes me into 
a service-provider, something that makes me merely something 
useful, a means. In the imperative mood, I say 'I want to be 
X, and you must be my Y.' And as a Y, the other's richness 
and thickness is exchanged for a thinness— a Y-ness to my X- 
ness. The other is not allowed to choose which structure we 
will inhabit together. In fact, when the relation between 
the other and me is in the imperative mood, the other's (and 
my) identity is more of an obstruction than an assistance to 
the perpetuation of the structures of the relation. That is, 
the other can only know me as a generality, an abstraction, a 
person that services to fill one of her lacunae. 
Professionalism as a mode of sociability is an excellent 
example of how the other is kept at a safe distance— she is 
generalized and compartmentalized. As professionals we treat 
clients a certain way, colleagues a certain way, secretaries 
and office help a certain way....
The interrogative gesture opens an indefinite field of 
expression for the other. Nothing is predetermined for the 
other. In the case of the stranger on the bus, her gesture 
of greeting opens a space where I can choose any direction—  
where I am allowed to explore. She too explores— by the fact 
that she sees how I explore. In the case of the friend who 
comes into the room, our conversation manifests itself as a 
playfulness— we disclose affectations, interrogations,
gambits. 44
But a problem analogous to the problem of generality 
with the imperative mood surfaces for the interrogative mood. 
Couples who have just started to see each other often find 
themselves at a point where they go round and round with the 
question: "what do you want to do?" "well, what do you want 
to do?" They awkwardly attempt to avoid any imposition on the 
other. That is, in the interrogative mood, we may maintain 
our dignity as self-determining agents, but there is no 
structure for us to be agents in at all. There is nothing to 
determine.
At some point, we have to make a decision. We have to 
have a project, we have to have something to talk about or 
some way of interacting. However, it is not that we come to 
these moments as transcendental, contextless intellects such 
that we would not have any impetus to choose one direction or 
framework over another. We are not Buridan's asses forever 
caught between water and food unable to make a decision which 
to have first. We are embodied consciousnesses with desires, 
agendas, and predilections that situate us such that when we 
come upon an other, we come upon that other with a mood, a 
disposition, a project. We are always and already involved. 
(This is what Merleau-Ponty reveals with his description of 
operative intentionality.) As a consequence, when the other 
comes on the scene, she comes on as either something relevant 
to the project at hand or as an opportunity to begin a new 
project. While I am reading in my room, a knock may come at
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my door. I answer the door and find my friend has come over 
to chat. She and her chat are distactions to my project of 
reading, I may ask her to leave because I have to read, or I 
may invite her in and take a break from my reading. While I 
am walking to a restaurant, I may be thinking about a certain 
television show when I bump into someone. I can tell her 
that I am on the way to dinner and cannot stop to talk, or I 
can invite her to comment on the television show.
What is at issue here is the fact that because we enter 
into relations with others out of projects and contexts that 
extend beyond our moment with the other, we find that we are 
led to determinations of the expressive space we have with 
the other. We have things to do, and every time others step 
onto the scene, their presence is seen against that 
background.
Reciprocity is the recognition of the fact that at some 
times some people must, because they have pressing 
circumstances and because something must be decided in order 
for us to even have an expressive medium, make determinations 
upon what kind of expressive medium we will use and what our 
project will be. We recognize that someone has to make a 
decision at some point in time, and we, out of that 
recognition, can see how such a decision fits in with the 
other's project— not as a general other, but as a specific 
other. That is, when I meet up with the other, she appears 
to me not as a reflection of myself upon myself (as she would
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for Sartre or any of those who use the argument by analogy), 
because she appears as a singular other with her own style of 
being— her own posture, her own way of putting things. Were 
others to appear solely as analogies to myself, they would 
have no distinctness, no identity beside the functions they 
serve in my life. However, when we recognize the other's 
mood, certain nuances in how she articulates her 
determinations of the expressive space, we see how our
project fits with her life. We can see how we fit in with
other people. Just by a waiter's body language and pitch of 
voice, I can tell whether or not he is being funny or nice to
me simply because he wants a tip or because he genuinely
likes chatting with customers. I can tell whether or not I 
am interrupting something important when I walk into a room 
by how people are sitting in their chairs, look at me, or 
respond to my overtures to engage in conversation. As a 
consequence, we decide to either play along with the other's 
project or withdraw from the project altogether. I can 
ignore fake waiters. I can leave meetings that have nothing 
to do with me.
Reciprocity, then, manifests itself as indulgence, 
broad-mindedness, and charity. We know certain things are 
important to other people. They make certain demands upon 
us, and when the demands are not outrageous, we comply— we go 
along. The distraught friend needs to be comforted, so I do 
my best to comfort her. The lady on the bus wants to be left
47
alone, so I leave her alone. The friend who drops by my 
house while I am reading wants to talk, so I may chat with 
her. The point is, when we make determinations of expressive 
spaces, we show each other what kind of life we want to live- 
-what things are important to us.
2) Overruning the other
The danger, though, is the fact that our own agendas can 
obscure the other's gestures toward us. That is, because the 
other steps on a scene already colored by our own desires, 
her desires can be considered to be beside the point. 
Moreover, if the other gestures in the interrogative mood or 
allows me to regularly determine the expressive space, I am 
given free reign to determine the practice at hand however I 
like. This leads to tyranny.
Let us say I am in a bar with a friend of mine. We 
belly up to the bar to order our drinks when she asks me what 
I will be having. I say I think that I will have a bottle of 
X. Oh no, not X, she says. You should have Y. It's a much 
better drink. So I order Y. We get a table. I ask her 
about her day. She tells me about her day and then suggests 
we talk about a certain book. I may have no opinion on the 
matter, so she proceeds to tell me what she thinks about the 
book. Later in the evening, I try to change the subject or 
tell her about my day. She seems uninterested; she looks 
around the bar or stares back at me glazed-eyed. I return to
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asking her what she wants to do or talk about, and she perks 
right up.
What this example is supposed to elucidate is how we can 
be tempted to react to the fact that others, even though 
their projects do not overlap with ours, defer to our 
projects; we can become self-centered, self-serving. What 
makes this situation possible is reciprocal practice— that 
is, when others go along with our demands out of deference to 
our style of life, we are tempted to think our style of life 
the only one that counts. The child who has tolerant parents 
(ones who listen attentively to everyting the child says, 
indulge the child's wishes, and make attempts to defer to the 
child's determinations) ususally comes out terribly spoiled 
instead of learning to be tolerant by the parents' examples. 
The same happens in everyday interaction— those who make 
demands in groups of tolerant people become more demanding 
than tolerant. Reciprocity begins to break down, because it 
makes room for tyranny. In reciprocity, we make room for 
ourselves to be overrun.
Playing opposite the tyrant has its stresses and 
strains. At some point in time, we ask ourselves if it is 
worth it. At some point in my night out at the bar with my 
bossy friend, I ask myself whether or not I am going to 
continue to tolerate being overrun. I decide either to 
assert myself by making a demand on the tyrannical other or 
point out the fact that she does not listen to me, or I play
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the martyr and continue to be overrun.
In the case of making a demand upon the tyrannical 
other, I try to usurp her position. I give her a taste of 
her own medicine. I demand that I be heard. I may be 
confrontational. I may tell her that her stories are boring 
and her drink choice is terrible. In any case, I make 
drastic determinations on how we interact, I call attention 
to myself and my dissatisfaction with how she is running our 
conversation. But in the case of playing the martyr, I 
resolve myself to deferring to the other's determinations and 
decisions. But I make this resignation, not out of finding 
that I cannot overcome her tyrany (even though I actually may 
not be able to), but because I see my resignation as a noble 
sacrifice — one in the name of reciprocity's tolerance. In 
turn, I make gestures to call attention to my compliance with 
the other's wishes regardless of my own wishes. I may evoke 
some thin earnestness when listening to her stories or make 
weak protestations before submitting to her will in the end.
I try to make my going-along appear to be a sacrifice. I 
work to make the tyrant feel guilty for forcing me to do her 
bidding.
The problem with either of these reactions to tyrany is 
the fact that both perpetuate tyranny. The first— usurping 
the tyrant— leads to a struggle of wills. In the end, 
neither individual will be able to even stand being around 
the other. The second— playing the martyr— does nothing more
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than call attention to the tyrany by giving into it. Even 
though the tyrant may feel guilty (which is not even 
guaranteed since the tyrant must first be acquainted with 
reciprocity for her to feel guilt over not enacting it), she 
does not necessarily have to stop being a tyrant. In fact, 
feeling guilty about being a tyrant would be one more topic 
of conversation for her to monopolize and control.
3) Antipodosis
The mark of reciprocity is the fact that it is a 
measured fairness. Each member of a conversation is allowed 
to run things for a while. Sometimes members exploit each 
other in the relationship, but such moments are few and far 
between and reparations are made once all members of the 
community are properly trained. That is, reciprocity is a 
state of relation between two people that must be tended, 
pruned, and weighed out. We take turns determining what the 
current project is. We make exchanges— I will go to the 
opera one night with my fiance, and she agrees to come to the 
truck and tractor pull the next night. In this respect, 
reciprocity is primarily prudential in nature— i.e., we make 
beneficent gestures in order to receive them. Reciprocity 
only seems broken in a relationship when I do not receive 
what I want from the other members.
However, our relations with others do not have to always 
be dialogical. That is, in the imperative-interrogative mood
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distinction, the tyrant-martyr coupling, and the circularity 
of reciprocity, our relationship with the other remains tied 
to the bipolarity of the subject and object. That is, in 
each, one member determines the project and the other either
goes along or challenges the determination. But Merleau-
\
Ponty had demonstrated that such bipolarity is not necessary. 
In the handshake, we encounter others not as objects or 
subjects but as a discovered otherness, an immanent 
transcendence, a feeling and felt hand. But what is this 
like in a continuous relationship with an other?
I am dribbling the ball in a soccer game. I push the 
ball forward into an open space. Suddenly, one of my 
teammates runs behind a defender and waves her hand to draw 
my attention. Our eyes lock, and I pass the ball. She 
dribbles downfield. I pass the ball not because she and I 
have an agreement that she will pass me the ball in the 
future. I don't pass her the ball because good passing is a 
means to the end being a winning goal. J pass her the ball 
because it fits. We may be joined together in a project with 
some definite end, but my motivation is more aesthetic than 
teleological. For a moment in our purposeful and 
deliberative machinations, we are spontaneous.
As with the handshake, neither is wholly in control of 
the situation. We both make our own contributions, but we do 
not obscure each other. I am both subject and object for the 
other and she for me. In this shared space, neither of us is
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the center of the practice. Rather, we graft onto one 
another in a neutral medium. Neither of us decides the ball 
has to be passed - we both act in such a way that it is. It 
is here that determination is beside the point— control of 
the situation falls from one person to the other, but we do 
not have to be usurping the role of the tyrant or dutifully 
allowing each other to control the course of events for a 
while. Instead, control remains anonymous. With the tyrant- 
martyr pairing and the reciprocal circle, control is never 
ambiguous at any moment. We set up a rules (explicitly or 
implicitly) for interaction, and never is it even a question 
who is in control. But when I pass the ball to my teammate
racing down the field, it is never clear who is in control.
Is she the one who demands the ball with her urgent hand
waving and determined run? Am I the one who makes the
determination by gracing her with the ball? We can't say.
In the handshake, too, it is ambiguous who is touching and 
who is being touched.
This anonymous control remains between the other and 
myself. It never congeals on either of us. It is like a 
hopping from foot to foot, not quite running, not quite 
standing, not quite staying still - it is antipodosis. Here, 
we find rapport with our friends. Here we find romance with 
our lovers. We are not measuring out who gets to decide 
what, but acting harmoniously.
When I see ,my friend, she is not a reflective analogue
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to my subjectivity. That is, I do not have to analogize her 
with myself to understand how to interact with her, which is 
what most bipolar theories of ethics would suggest. I do not 
have to ask myself how I would want me to treat her were I 
her. When I begin to think that way, everything I do seems 
forced. I would not be able to joke with her. I would not 
be able to strike upon any natural rhythm with her. Here 
would be where we would have to begin to make rules for 
interaction with each other. But when I normally come upon 
my friend, I know how to interact with her. I may not be 
able to articlate or bring to light all the rules for our 
interaction (there may not even be any rules for all our 
exchanges), but when we involve ourselves in a project 
together, things seems to fall into place. We gear ourselves 
into each other.
The same with my lover. When our bedroom involvement 
becomes rule-bound as reciprocity would dictate (such that if 
I do X for her, then she will do Y for me), our lovemaking 
takes on the hue of an exchange economy. Our relations 
reduce to sexual opportunism. But when we are caught up with 
each other, when we have nothing more at stake than being 
with each other, when neither one of us dictates what goes 
on, we interact antipodetically.
So the problem is that with reciprocity (and other forms 
of dialogical relations with others), we remain distant from 
the other. The syntax of exchange of goods and services
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takes the place of possible communication and rapport. The 
other and I remain generalizations in an unambiguous 
structure. We do business. Traditional (rule-based) ethics 
work relatively well here, but when the situation gets 
smaller and more ambiguous, traditional ethics has nothing 
more to say. How would we run my passing in a soccer game 
through the Categorical Imperative? So the question still 
remains, how do we get along on a day-to-day basis? How I 
may pass the soccer ball in a game may have no real moral 
import, but it does reflect how I get along with the others 
around me. (Moreover, most diehard soccer fans would contend 
that an unwillingness to pass the ball is indicative of 
severe moral deviancy.)
What this discussion ammounts to, then, is a description 
of certain situations in which we fall into a rapport with 
others— where we get along without the strictures of rule- 
boundedness. These moments are the moments that inform our 
moral intuitions— they are moments reciprocity constantly 
tries to re-attain. In no way then, is reciprocity any less 
morally worthy or actually good. What it is is derivative, 
and the same can be said for any system of rules governing 
behavior. Antipodosis, then, is a certain structural moment 
that resists structural description, because we are acting 
spontaneously and without rule-determinations.
Wittgenstein's Two Senses of 'Understanding'
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I. Meaning, use, understanding, and being able to go on.
Wittgenstein contends in his later work that language is a 
field of related activities, each with its own style. These 
activities, like commanding, chatting, questioning, counting, 
and reciting, are each integral parts of (and compliments to) 
other non-speaking activities like walking, drinking, eating, 
and playing.1 In light of this contention, words have certain 
meanings because they are used in certain public and 
conventional situations. A sense of propriety goes along 
with conventions, and meaning lies within the realm of how 
certain activities in certain situations are related to (or 
bear some resemblance to) what is appropriate to those 
situations. The meanings of words are the conventional roles 
the words play in a language.
When we understand, we do not do anything extra-linguistic. 
To understand is not to grasp some non-linguistic object by 
decoding linguistic signs. Instead, understanding is a 
technique of seeing how certain utterances or activities are 
appropriate (either with relation to other utterances or to 
certain situations) and, in turn, responding appropriately.
For instance, if I were to say to someone "Get me a glass of 
water," I would know the person has understood by her 
response. Either she would say "O.K." and get me a glass of
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosphical Investigations, trans. 
G.E.M. Anscombe (Englewood Cliffs: Harper and Row, 1958) 
section 25.
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water, or refuse to do so by saying something to the effect
"Get your own." Complimentarily, we would not say she
understands if she takes off her shoe and tosses it through a
window, invades Poland, or makes some sort of gesture we have
never seen before. So, the relationship between a command
and a response is always one of convention of what is linked
to what. The criterion for whether or not someone has
understood is not, then, what picture she has in her mind
when a command is made, but how she behaves after the
command. When we say someone understands addition, we expect
her to be able to do addition. When we say someone
understands a series, we expect him to be able to complete 
2the series. We expect people who we say understand to be 
able to go on— to respond in some manner that is
3conventionally appropriate.
This account of meaning and understanding in terms of use
and being able to go on stands distinct from common
misconceptions of meaning and understanding - those in terms 
of grasping a rule. In a nutshell, these misconceptions 
amount to this: meaning is determined by rules, and when we
understand we grasp those rules. Wittgenstein's discussion 
of rules in sections 143 through 242 of the Philosophical 
Investigations shows how these misconceptions are incomplete 
as descriptions of how we understand. His first counter to
2 Cf. PI.143.
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1960) p.132.
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the rule-oriented misconception is that the rules for the 
practice will never exhaust the practice. In fact, knowing 
how to play a game may never involve learning the rules to 
the game. Wittgenstein suggests we imagine learning how to 
play chess without having been told the rules but by watching
4the game being played. Moreover, when we are presented with 
a set of rules for a practice, we have to interpret them in 
order to understand the practice. Unless there are rules for 
interpreting rules (and rules for those rules ad infinitum), 
we have to interpret the rules (and act) without 
justification.5 As a consequence, if rules were the 
determining factors for meaning and use, we would have a 
paradox, because "no course of action could be determined by 
a rule, because every course of action can be made out in 
accord with the rule."6 But Wittgenstein shows the way out: 
"following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are 
trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way."7 
That is, the regularity of rules' application is contingent 
on the regularity of technique of obeying the rule. The 
practice being described by the rules, then, must be 
logically prior to its rules (and not the other way around), 
because without the regular techniques of applying the 
practice's rules, the rules would not be able to say
4 BB.13.
5 Cf. PI.217, 219.
6 PI.201.
7 PI.206.
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anything.
Wittgenstein's second counter to the rule-oriented 
misconception is that because rules are public entities, it 
is impossible to follow a rule privately (or follow a rule in 
one's head). Following a rule is a public practice. As a 
consequence, to understand an utterance, just grasping (by 
having a certain picture in one's head) the rules for its 
meaning is not enough - because there is no public criterion 
for that understanding. Understanding must be public, and it 
must be in the form of going on. And this going on - when we 
understand - accords with the rules of the practice, but is 
not determined by them. That is, rules allow and disallow 
usage. They do not determine usage. Consequently, they do 
not help us understand a sentence's meaning, because they do 
not say anything that might reveal anything more than whether 
the usage is or is not allowed.
II. The Two Senses of "Understanding"
In sections 531-533 of the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein is concerned with two senses of "understanding" 
which may be called: (1) paraphrastic understanding and (2) 
poetic or intransitive understanding.
We speak of understanding a sentence in the 
sense in which it can be replaced by another which 
says the same; but also in the sense in which it
8 PI.202.
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cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one 
musical theme can be replaced by another.)
In one case the thought in the sentence is 
something common to different sentences; in the 
other, something is expressed only by these words 
in these positions. (Understanding a poem)9
(1) In the first sense, "understanding" means the ability 
to replace one sentence with another which says the same 
thing. It is paraphrasing. Conventionally, the ability to 
paraphrase a sentence is considered a worthy indicator of 
understanding— it is a mastery of a technique of expression. 
Paraphrasing demonstrates a familiarity with the varieties of 
ways one sense can be constructed within the rules of a 
language— like knowing all the different tools that can be 
used to do the same thing. (Consider the way that a common 
simple sentence such as "I'm tired" can be paraphrased with 
"I'm beat" or "I'm worn out" - or more tellingly, how many 
different ways a sportscaster can say one team beat another.)
What is implicit in paraphrastic understanding is a 
reduplication of a sentence's use in a language-game. So, in
a language L, if a sentence with sense (use) s is replaced
with sentence S2 , the criterion for determining whether S2 is 
being used successfully as paraphrasis is its relation to s 
(whether or not s can be S2 's use) and not to S]_. That is, 
the criterion is in terms of the commensurability of Si'S and 
S2 's range of use— the criterion is the "thought of the
9 PI.531.
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sentence [that] is ... common to different sentences."10 That 
"thought" is the use to which the sentences are put, and the 
sameness of that use is nothing other than how the sentence 
affects the rest of the language game in which it is being 
used. If the practice continues no differently than before, 
then the paraphrasis is successful; if not, then the meaning 
is changed.
The way paraphrasis is achieved, though, is by comparing
the effect and S2 respectively have on the language-game. 
Since s (the use) does not exist independently of them, there 
is no pre-existent set of ideas or senses to which these 
sentences are to correspond. By this, the relation between
Si and S2 is not arrived at by way of sense as an 
intermediary (like a third man), but by way of sense as the 
respective sentences' shared place in a language L . Put 
simply, a sentence's sense does not exist independently of 
its use (since its sense is its use), and its use cannot 
exist independently of the sentence— as if one could 
"airball" or "brick" without basketball talk.
Paraphrastic understanding has one particularly 
obvious usage: to demonstrate the use of a sentence in a 
language game by replacing it with another sentence with the 
same use. Paraphrasis can be used for clarification. Usually 
this practice designates a certain sense s which might not
10 PI. 531, emphasis mine.
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unambiguously have in that context, but S2 does (or at least
if S2 is also ambiguous, they share s as one of many uses).
S2 clarifies the way is being used. This is how we would 
explain how the farmer who fed dollar bills to her cows so 
that they would have rich milk erred.
Paraphrastic understanding also draws attention to the 
structure of the language game that the sentences are in. 
Paraphrasis gives a road map of the language game— the 
different ways of getting to the same place. in paraphrasis, 
the practice speaks for itself. The practice's well worn 
roads come to light. Its conventions and ingrained ways of 
doing the same things become clear. Remember that sports 
caster with all the ways of saying one team beat another?
The problem is that clarification is often confused with 
explanation— demonstrating the sense of a sentence in one 
language game Ll by replacing it with a sentence with an 
analogous sense in another language game L2. Explanation 
consists of a comparison of syntactical relations in the 
analogous uses in the language games. So, "in order to 
'explain' [a musical piece] I could only compare it with 
something else which has the same rhythm (I mean same 
pattern)."11 Explanation takes the form of translation - 
taking an obscure or unfamiliar expression and replacing it 
with one that is familiar. In the case of some unfamiliar
11 PI.527.
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expression (an expression in an unfamiliar language-game)
which would "look like implements, but I don't know their
use,"12 the replacement expression S2 explains Si's use with
its own use in L2. This works well sometimes, because 
translation points out and works from similarities between 
language games, and many language games have extensive 
similarities. The practices that surround the use of color- 
words in Indo-European languages is an adequate example, and 
even a discussion of offensive tactics in soccer can be 
translated into hockey-talk. So what distinguishes 
paraphrastic understanding (clarification) from explanation 
(translation) is the language game of which the replacement 
sentence is a part. Paraphrasis stays within the original 
language game, and explanation goes outside of it.
(2)Wittgenstein's second sense of "understanding" is poetic 
or intransitive understanding— in which the sense of the 
original sentence cannot be commensurate or replaceable with 
that of another sentence. Such replacement is impossible, 
because the relation between the sentence and its sense is 
exclusive. (Imagine the damage that could be done to the 
Homeric expression "rosy-fingered dawn" in paraphrasis or 
explanation, what would happen to Keenan-Ivory Wayans' "I'm 
gonna get you sucka," or Frank Black's "my heart is crammed 
in my cranium— and it still knows how to pound".) No other
12 PI.526.
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sentence can have that sense— it is "something that is
expressed only by these words in these positions."13 Poetic
expression creates its own use with its coinage. Its use is
irreplacable in the same way that Wittgenstein says:
I should like to say that "what the picture tells 
me is itself." That is, its telling me something 
consists in its own structure, in its own lines 
and contours14.
Wittgenstein had pointed this out as early as 1932 in
Philosophical Grammar:
It may be that if it is to achieve its effect, a 
particular word cannot be replaced by any other; 
just as it may be that a particular gesture cannot 
be replaced by any other.... No one would believe 
a poem remained essentially unaltered if its words 
were replaced by others in accordance with an 
appropriate convention.15
Intransitive understanding, then, is the ability to inhabit
an uncanny and original expressive practice. This
inhabitation and this space are what is created when we
understand or "go on" in a completely unique way. Because
changes in meaning manifest themselves as changes in
behaviour, we inhabit this space by the fact the we act
within it— we appropriate it as a way of behaving, a way of
living. However, the way in which it is achieved is
dependent on paraphrastic understanding, because the way a
certain expression makes sense is through its relation to
13 PI.531.
14 PI.523, italics mine.
15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush 
Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkely: U. California Press, 
1974) p. 69.
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already sedimented rules and uses. In the way that meaning 
the same thing means "going on" in the same way (as 
paraphrastic understanding works), intransitive understanding 
comes about by going on in a different way - not a radically 
different way, but one that shares a family resemblance to 
the ways we have responded to similar expressions. The 
poetic expression is reminiscent of already sedimented 
practices (and this is how we can step into them when they 
are poeticized versions of familiar practices), but they also 
make a new and remarkably different application of the rules 
by which those previous practices proceeded.
Colin Falck notes that the "moving forward of the human 
spirit" brought about in poetry, art, and other expressive 
media relies on the grammar of previous expressions.16 Each 
successive grammar reveals the possibilities of its 
predecessor. "Metaphor builds on the language-uses we already
17have m  an organic, and not a random way." The organic 
nature of the relationship between the metaphor (intransitive 
expression) and sedimented usage is one of reminiscence or 
resemblance; that the grammar is not razed to the ground, but 
is subtlely altered. It is given a twist. Regular usage of 
words develops habits and prejudices about how those words 
are to be used. New usages of these words, then, cater to
16 Colin Falck, " Poetry and Wittgenstein," printed in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: Critical Assesments, Vol. 4, ed. Stuart Shanker 
(Dover,NH: Croom Helm, 1986) pp. 371-81.
17 Ibid., p. 372.
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those prejudices (instead of completely throwing all of them 
out)— otherwise we cannot understand.
An example of how "one explains the expression, [or]
transmits one's understanding" may make things a bit
18clearer. Take, for example, a genre-picture. If the genre 
is not known, it will be unfamiliar to people who look at it- 
-they may not be able to make use of it. (Imagine ancient 
Egyptians looking at an Impressionist painting.) There are 
two ways we could approach bringing these people to an 
understanding of the painting: it could either be (a) 
explained, or (b) understood intransitively/poetically. 
Paraphrasing is not an option, since there is no other 
sentence or expression which has the same use. Moreover, 
paraphrasing presupposes a mastery of the realm of practice 
that the expression is in— conseguently, the paraphrasis 
would be just as unintelligible as the original expression.
(a) If we decide to explain the painting, what we do is 
rework the painting in a manner that is intelligible to our 
pedagogical subjects. (We reword the unintelligible poem.)
We might point to lines and colors on the canvas and say, 
"That's a chair" or "That's a horse." We might also draw 
another picture in a familiar style that allows 
understanding. We also might say, "it's just like that other 
painting you know - the one with the...." We set the 
painting alongside familiar paintings. We say it simply. We 
18 PI.533.
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put it in "layman's terms," in a language that these 
individuals can paraphrase. But the analogy that supports 
the explanation is only a partial one that transforms the 
uncanniness of an intransitive expression into something 
familiar and conventional.
Kjell Johannssen notes in a similar discussion of the 
distinction betwen paraphrastic and intransitive 
understanding that in aesthetics, such a procedure offends 
our sensibilities - that we would leave something out, that 
"understanding paintings is not primarily a matter of
19translating them into some other medium of expression." 
Consequently, the way that our pedagogical subjects will view 
such genre paintings in the future will be ignorant of the 
analogy's incompleteness, because they will not even come 
into contact with that uncanniness; the unique place the 
expression holds in the other language-game (painting). They 
do not know the rules it re-interprets. Moreover, these 
individuals will not be able to tell original expressions in 
this practice from sedimented expressions. The uncanniness 
and resonance of the original expression— what is the most 
compelling and affecting thing about it— is lost. These 
individuals will look in translation. (This is the danger of 
such things as beginner's guides to realms of discourse,e.g.
19 Kjell Johannssen, "Art, Philosophy, and Intransitive 
Understanding," in Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-Evaluation,
ed. Rudolph Haller and Johannes Brandi (Vienna: Verlag- 
Holder-Pichler-Tumpsky, 1990) p. 328.
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Cliff's notes, masterplots, etc.. The reader begins to think 
of the texts themselves as embellished, confused, and wordy 
embodiments of their explanations.)
(b) If we decide that these individuals should come to
intransitive understanding of the painting, we must "lead"
20them to comprehension. This "leading" is something entirely 
different from explanation. Instead of taking the expression 
in an unfamiliar and original genre and putting it into a 
familiar genre, the leading acclimates these individuals to 
the original and unfamiliar genre. We teach the use of a new 
tool by teaching a new technique. We engender appreciation 
for a genre by having the individuals inhabit the genre, 
learn its rules and their conventional applications by 
applying them themselves. We set the painting alongside 
similar paintings. We then bring our students to a point 
where paraphrasis within the practice is understandable, and 
by this, we engender the ability to recognize the uncanniness 
and resonance of a poetic or original expression within that 
practice. We bring our students into the practice the 
expression is part of, and by this, they develop a feeling 
for the congruency of the practice. A nose for congruency is 
the precondition for a nose for difference. They then can 
understand the originality and uncanniness of the expression- 
-how it is both congruent with what has been done, but 
somehow radically different too. This is not available to 
20 PI.534.
69
explanation. Intransitive understanding, then, is not just 
different from explanation in approach, but it is different 
in kind.
But the question still remains: how exactly does 
acclimation to this practice and recognition of originality 
and uncanniness take place? The clearest answer is training. 
Our linguistic practices are rule-bound, but they are not 
exhausted in their entirety by the rules. Wittgenstein notes,
"my reasons soon give out. And then I shall act without
2 1reasons." In lxght of this "running out," the training has 
two goals: (i) to allow those trained to recognize the 
appropriate and inappropriate actions within the rule-bounded 
expressive space (to develop the ability to understand 
paraphrasis), and (ii) to be able, as a consequence of (i), 
to recognize the original and uncanny application of a rule. 
It is in (ii) that these individuals recognize that "the 
application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules,"
and that the poetic expression pushes that rule-boundedness
22where there is no rule determining the use of a word. 
Intransitivity also draws our attention to the structure of 
the language game— but one with a changed perspective. 
Intransitive expressions (like paraphrastic expressions) 
allow the practice to "speak for itself." What is revealed, 
though,is not merely the well-worn paths of somnambulistic
21 PI.211.
22 PI.84.
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usage (as it does with paraphrasis), but of a new way to go 
on and how it is tied to those of well worn paths. Our 
pedagogical subjects recognize the contingency of the 
expression, the contingency of the rule's application, and, 
by this, the contingency of the very style of being (or 
speaking) which produces the expression.
Those who coin and use new expressions and the ones who 
understand them make themselves free of conventionalized 
practices, because they have created a new way of being. 
Because any difference in meaning must manifest itself as a 
difference in speech and behaviour, understanding's practical 
correlative— being able to go on— in the case of intransitive 
expressions is itself intransitive. Intransitive 
understanding jolts us out of our sedimented linguistic 
practices, throws us into new perspectives, launches us into 
new ways of being and doing. However, this re-creation's 
intelligibility (possibility of practice) hinges wholly on 
the recognizability of the re-created rule. If the old rule 
and practice are still recognizable as standing behind the 
new practice, the expression's audience and speaker can make 
use of it. The expression invites practice, because its 
rules are still perspicuous— the audience can "go on" with 
it. The audience can find a foothold. On the other hand, if 
the expression does not bring out the old rule in a way that 
gives the expression a realm of some form of familiar 
practice (if the expression does not lend itself to any kind
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of use), the audience is inclined to believe the speaker 
inept or insane (or at best speaking a different language).
The condition that poetic expressions must meet is the 
analogy between its own style and the style of the practice 
upon which it is parasitic. The poet must be aware of the 
tradition being re-created and whether a re-creation of that 
tradition would be intelligible. Because some rules are more 
central to certain languages than others, re-creations of 
these rules will be less and less intelligible in accordance 
with the rule's centrality. The more central the rule is to 
the language game, the less intelligible its re-working will 
be. This is because intelligibility of an expression is 
first and foremost the ability we have to make use of that 
expression, and when a rule's application that stands at the 
root of the language game is re-created (changed or merely 
ignored), the interpreter is given no way to put the 
interpretation into practice, in other words, when an 
intransitive expression re-creates a central grammatical rule 
(one which is necessary for meaning in the language game), 
the expression is merely unintelligible, it is a mistake. It 
precludes its own use. (Imagine a re-creation of the rule by 
which we organize words in a declarative sentence— e.g. "My 
is tie blue".) These rules are developed by linguistic 
communities as necessary conditions for sense.
Max Black's discussion of rule formation as identification 
of aspects of speech acts within linguistic communities ((i)
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required, (ii) forbidden, or (iii) permitted) is helpful
23here. Required speech acts (i) are the necessary conditions 
for intelligibly participating in a linguistic practice. 
Forbidden speech acts (ii) preclude speakers from even 
participating. Permitted speech acts (iii) can be used, but 
they are not necessary for meaningful use. Rules that 
require (i) or forbid (ii) speech acts are what is at issue; 
they are the central rules. When a speaker does not accord 
with (i) or (ii), the speaker is no longer meaningfully 
engaged in the practice, and the rest of the linguistic 
community either sees the individual as confused (and the 
community tries to correct or re-train the individual) or the 
community sees the individual as utterly helpless, hopeless, 
or insane. Either way, the speech act is not even recognized 
to be engaged in the practice in which it was used, because 
to respond to the expression would result in razing the 
practice to the ground. The utterance is a tool without an 
application.
However, when an expression has to do with a less central 
rule— a rule which permits a speech act (iii) and which does 
not forbid certain uses or is not a necessary condition for 
sense in the language game— the expression does not make a 
preclusion of its own use. Instead, the expression offers an 
alternative (but similar) practice to the one re-created.
23 Max Black, Models and Metaphors, (Ithaca:Cornell U.
Press,1962) pp. 107-8.
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Realms of practice within the language game are still open to 
this expression which are not open to the expression that re­
creates central rules. The utterance does not cut itself off 
from the language in which it was intended to be meaningful, 
because it takes up an aspect of the linguistic practice that 
is not subject to correction. For such speech acts, there is 
no logical limit (in terms of normative restrictions) to the 
possible activities that could be introduced into a 
linguistic practice.
In light of this discussion, two conditions for 
intelligibility (usefulness) for intransitive expressions can 
be distilled. They must (a) be such that they are different, 
but also reminiscent of similar expressions in an ordered 
language game, and (b) they must not be contrary to the rules 
central to that language game. Because intransitive 
expressions push between the ordinary forms of justified 
actions (ones which appeal to necessary conditions and 
customary permissions) and the ordinary forms of unjustified 
actions (ones which bear no resemblance to any activities in 
the practice or ones which are explicitly made forbidden), 
the utterance provides its own justification. There are no 
identical activities that the speaker can gesture toward for 
justification. The intransitive utterance stands by itself.
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III. How intransitivity becomes a problem
In light of the fact that differences in meaning are 
manifested as differences of behaviour (a difference in how 
we go on), it is possible that styles of being with 
intransitive expressions may become conventionalized and 
habitualized, and by this transformation, the expression 
loses its earlier power of liberating language users from the 
strictures of sedimented practices and habits. Here is how.
1) As shown earlier, when we say people understand, we 
expect them to be able to go on. That is, we make a 
distinction between people who understand and those who do 
not by the way they act. Those who understand something act 
a certain way, and those who do not understand act in another 
or in a multiplicity of other ways. For example, we say only 
people who can successfully add understand addition.
2) Because languages have rules which necessitate and 
exclude certain usages, intransitive expressions, when 
coined, must be judged to be admissible or inadmissible by a 
community of speakers familiar with the language and those 
rules. Speakers of a language are those who decide whether 
or not a new way of speaking is to be allowed in the 
language. They are the ones who distinguish intelligible 
from unintelligible expressions.
3) Those who understand an expression have the ability to 
make use of it. Upon understanding an utterance, speakers of 
a language have a way of determining when it is appropriate
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to use the expression- In effect, when the situation in 
which the intransitive utterance was coined (or a situation 
with a resemblance to the original situation) is repeated, 
those who understood the expression in the former can use it 
in the latter. Think of all those famous lines from Pulp 
Fiction being parroted by gen-X'ers. If the appropriate 
situation is common in a language-game (or if there are many 
situations that resemble the original situation), the 
expression can gain a wider range of usage. Because 
understanding an expression pushes us into new ways of 
behaving, the behaviour sets the stage for more situations in 
which the expression can be used. With each new usage, the 
language shifts, because the practice of speaking the 
language is changed. And with each repeated usage of the 
intransitive expression, the expression moves closer and 
closer to the center of the language game. The expression 
becomes conventional.
4) Regular usage of an expression makes the expression 
(and its attendant behaviour) more and more central to the 
practice of speaking a language. The expression becomes more 
and more secured, more and more conventional. (This is where 
the difference between fashion and fad, slang and cliche, 
originality and banality is formed.) At this point, the 
expression is still reminiscent of its first resonance and 
uncanniness, but the coin becomes tarnished with its regular 
and systematic usage. Originality becomes concretized. In
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addition, when certain marginal forms of expression become 
more and more prevalent, they begin to lose the force they 
once had. The context in which they had been originally used 
becomes beside the point. The expressions' contexts become 
so wide and so nebulous, the expressions no longer even mean 
what they originally meant. For example, the adage "Neither 
a borrower nor a lender be" has been taken to be one of 
Shakespeare's kernels of wisdom and has been quoted and 
invoked so regularly, we rarely (except for those of us who 
read Hamlet carefully) recognize the fact that the expression 
was supposed to be ironic. Polonius uttered it in a fit of
24dottermg about burdening his son with advice.
5) Once an expression becomes more and more central to a 
practice, it breeds its own rules. It breeds normative 
behaviour that gestures to the expression when justifying or 
eliminating other expressions. "We [develop] prejudices with 
respect to the use of words," and the irony is that the 
prejudice comes out of an expression which was originally 
used in a way that jarred those who understood it out of 
their previous prejudices. The danger at this point is to 
say (as would those bewitched by their prejudices) that this 
new way of speaking is more useful than the one prior or 
(even if we were to recognize the inclinations to speak one 
way or another as a prejudice) that one certain prejudice 
represents reality better than another or a previous one.
24 Cf. Hamlet. I.iii.79.
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Wilfrid Sellars' discussion of the "Jonesian Myth" is 
helpful here.25 Sellars' hypothetical Mr. Jones falls into a 
similar pit of bewitchment with a new and powerful way of 
speaking. Jones is a man who learns a framework of discourse 
about public objects, but he has "taught himself to play with 
it as a report language. Unfortunately,... [and] with a 
modesty forgivable in any but a philosopher, he confuses his 
own creative enrichment of the framework of empirical
2 gknowledge, with an analysis of knowledge as it was".
Because of_ his confusion in his attitude with respect to his 
change in the language of possible objects, Jones speaks 
(when in reference to public objects) of a given from which 
all knowledge of these objets springs. "He construes as 
data the particulars and arrays of particulars which he has 
come to be able to observe, and believes them to be 
antecedent objects of knowledge which have somehow been in
27the framework from the beginning." And because of the 
semantic changes in the language due to the new expression 
described in (3) (i.e. that changes in certain parts of a 
practice affect the practice globally) the meanings 
constructed by the new habits become the given. These 
structures become "the privileged matters of fact" to which 
claims for legitimacy appeal (or from which these claims are
25 Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1956.
26 Ibid., p. 529.
27 Ibid., p. 539.
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28derived). Once a certain form of behaviour becomes 
concretized to this extent, those who make use of and inhabit 
that way of being, lose sight of its contingency. They 
become absorbed in "an episode of the Myth" such that the 
role of the community's approval (in 1 and 2) are ignored to 
the point that when asked for a genealogy of the practice, 
they speak as if the world (independently of language) 
provided cue-cards for the language's development, and not 
that it was merely a matter of a certain community coming to 
certain agreements about how to talk. As Sellars describes 
him, Jones falls into this sensibility, and intransitive 
expressions, by their very nature of compelling us to change 
the way we are by showing us a new way of being, have the 
power to bewitch us by their creative enrichment of already 
available discourses.
Wittgenstein provides a wonderful example of bewitchment 
with his description of a response to Schopenhauer's 
contention that man's real life span is 100 years. 
Wittgenstein's interlocutor gives a wistful cry, "yes, that 
is how it is... because that's how it must be!" Of course, 
it would all make sense that way. "It's as though you've 
understood a creator's purpose. You have grasped the
29system." In a sense, we feel tempted to "make divinities of
28 Ibid., p. 508.
29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von 
Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 1980) 
p. 26.
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30logical constants."
But examples for this kind of progression need not be so
obscure. As language-users (in the widest sense), we see
this kind of progression afoot in every aspect of culture:
the West-Coast offense, body-piercing, "awesome," alt-rock,
"alrighty then," having a coke and a smile, being "cool,"
being "bad," being "rad," being "yourself," the nickel
defense, whatever. The very utterances which opened new
ways of being close off subsequent ways of being. Gestures
which added richness to what were grammatically determined
practices become part of that machinery of determination.
What was once novel and liberating is now banal and
constricting.
Our ordinary language, which of all possible 
notations is the one which pervades all our life, 
holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, 
and in this position sometimes feels cramped....
Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which 
stresses a difference or one which in a particular 
case uses a more closely similar form of expression 
than our ordinary language. Our mental cramp is 
loosened when we are shown the notations which 
fulfill these needs 31
The problem at issue here is that once we have met this need,
we make what had relieved our mental cramp part of the
problem. What was originally a twist or a critique of
"common sense," after a bit of usage, becomes "common sense"
with the same hum-drum-self-contentment that necessitated
such twists and critiques in the first place.
30 CV .22.
31 BB.59, emphasis mine.
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IV. What is to be done?
In this age of post-Wittgensteinian philosophy, we are 
compelled to ask ourselves when presented with a problem:
"how must we look at a problem in order for it to become
32solvable?" We should be taking up new descriptive 
strategies such that problems are no longer problems; we need 
to find ways to dissolve problems. But this problem is not 
one that can be solved in this way, because the problem is 
one with the very strategy with which these problems are 
dissolved. When we provide a new outlook or way of speaking 
in order to dissolve one problem, we become prejudiced toward 
using that manner of speaking. We mistake a tincture for a 
panacea.
Richard Rorty faces this situation at the end of his
33Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Once it is clear that 
the philosophical enterprise is no longer an inquiry into 
essences or representation (i.e. epistemology), what reason 
do we even have for redescription (offering new descriptive 
strategies, making or using intransitive expressions)? When 
we replace knowledge with self-formation as the goal of 
thinking, we see just why these movements of novelty are 
necessary. "The events which make (and allow) us able to say
32 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on Color, ed. G.E.M.
Anscombe, trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schattle 
(Berkeley: U. California Press, 1977) II. section 11.
33 Richard Rorty. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
(Princeton:Princeton U. Press, 1979)
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new and interesting things about ourselves are, in the 
nonmetaphysical sense, more 'essential' to us than the events 
[and conventionalized practices] whic ... shape our standard
34of living." Those new and interesting gestures and 
utterances are what edify us in the face of the homogeneity 
of convention— "edifying discourse is supposed to be 
abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of
35strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings." in the face 
of the problem of conventionalization in the practice of 
philosophy, Rorty distinguishes systematic philosophers and 
edifying philosophers. The latter are first and foremost 
skeptical of systematic philosophy, but not because they 
stand as revolutionaries to contented actors and speakers. 
Both kinds of philosopher offer new descriptive strategies, 
because both are discontented with and stifled by the 
conventional theoretical discourse. But the difference lies 
in what these philosophers plan to do with their new ways of 
speaking.36 Systematic philosophers are constructive and 
offer arguments such that their manner of speaking may be 
institutionalized. Their battle cry is "the end of 
philosophy." They "build for eternity." They put their 
subject on the path of a science. The systematic philosopher 
recognizes what will happen to this new way of speaking and 
is more than willing to embrace it.
34 Ibid., p. 359.
35 Ibid., p. 360.
36 Ibid., p. 369.
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The edifying philosophers, on the other hand, "dread the 
thought that their vocabularies should ever be 
institutionalized, or that their writing might be seen as 
commensurable with the tradition."37 To avoid this, they are 
reactive to the systematists. They write satires and 
parodies. They offer only aphorisms. They speak and write 
in ways that are intentionally peripheral. They adopt a 
style that they suppose cannot become an institution. 
Consequently, edifying philosophy is always parasitic, always 
needing something to critique, always needing a straight-man 
to converse with, confound, and ultimately exasperate. The 
role that the edifying philosopher plays, then, is that of 
helping us to avoid the bewitchment and self-deception which 
comes from believing our current way of speaking to be 
final. The edifying philosopher sees human beings as 
"generators of new descriptions rather than beings one hopes
38to be able to describe accurately." And, by this attitude,
the edifying philosopher furnishes the rest of the community
with a wealth of reasons to find a new way of speaking and
may even offer up her own as an option.
One way to see edifying philosophy ... is to see it 
as the attempt to prevent conversation from 
degenerating into inquiry, into a research program. 
Edifying philosophers can never end philosophy.39
The reason why edifying philosophers know they must "keep the
37 Ibid., p. 377.
38 Ibid., p. 378.
39 Ibid., p. 372, emphasis mine.
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conversation going" is because not only do they feel the 
"mental cramp" Wittgenstein had gestured toward, but also 
because they see the danger of setting up a final and 
privileged vocabulary. They are trying to prevent a freeze- 
over of their discipline and their culture. What is so 
frightening about the possibility is the automatic nature of 
thought once certain descriptions are no longer being 
questioned. In the same way we are suspicious that people 
who justify their decisions with cliches (e.g. Polonius and 
those who make use of his expressions) are not really 
thinking, the edifying philosopher has the sneaking suspicion 
that once a discipline's final vocabulary and theoretical 
issues are put to rest, that discipline will become one big 
cliche with unthinking practitioners. We will cease to be 
human, because we will begin to see ourselves as something 
decided.40
The edifying philosopher, acting as the philosophical 
anarchist, works to dismantle the systematics in a manner 
that cannot be systematized. That is, they decry the very 
notion of having a definite view while denying they 
themselves have definite views. This, of course, is a self- 
referential paradox, but the edifying philosopher does not 
seem to even be phased by this charge.
But regardless of this technical absurdity, does Rorty's 
romanticized edifying philosopher do enough? According to
40 Ibid., p. 377.
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Rorty, Heidegger was an edifying philosopher par excellence, 
but his language became institutionalized jargon almost 
immediately. Heidegger himself was appalled that his 
expression "language is the house of Being" had become a 
"mere catchword"41 It does no good to be appalled, and it 
does no good to try to keep it from happening. As it 
appears, no matter what the intent with which these new ways 
of speaking are posed they ensnare us. Even if they demand 
that they be surpassed, they become entrapments. Style alone 
cannot keep ways of speaking and writing from becoming 
institutions. They inevitably become encrusted with 
convention. In light of this problem with Rorty's attempt to 
dissolve the issue with a new descriptive strategy, it does 
not matter what is said, who is saying it, or how it was 
meant to be taken, because if the expression or way of being 
resonates (is useful), it will be turned into an institution. 
(Just look at any journal of literary criticism, where it 
seems, ironically, everybody writes just like Derrida, but 
not in jest. Even better, just look at how counter-culture 
has a dress code.)
Wittgenstein's discussion of Breuer, Freud's co-author in 
Studies in Hysteria, points in a fruitful direction. 
Wittgenstein says that "the real germ of psycho-analysis came 
from Breuer, not Freud. Of course, Breuer's seed-grain can
41 Cf. Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1971) p.27.
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42only have been quite tiny. Courage is always original."
Where did this courage lie for Breuer? Breuer's humility in
the face of facts and their explanations is obvious in his
collaborations with Freud (especially against the backdrop of
Freud's brashness). He was not inclined to trace the
etiology of hysteria and neuroses directly back to erotic
breakdown every time, and Wittgenstein had noted that Breuer
had first proposed, but then dismissed the generalization of
the seductive paradigm. Jaques Bouveresse notes in
Wittgenstein Reads Freud how Wittgenstein had seen the
temptation to finalize and divinize the language and method
of psychoanalysis, and had pointed out that giving in to that
temptation is an indication of a profound desire to distill
ourselves, to make divinities of certain concepts.
For Wittgenstein, a person who thinks there must be 
one correct explanation and one correct reason 
for the sort of phenomena treated in psychoanalysis 
is not someone merely adopting a dominant 
scientific attitude, but someone who is already on 
the road to producing a mythology.43
Breuer, nevertheless, continued to make use of the
descriptive (and investigative) strategy, not because he
wanted it to (or believed it to) work in all cases all the
time, but because he saw the limits of it, and was aware of
when his usage of the strategy stretched it to the point
where it became a dogmatism and not a description. Breuer's
42 CV .36.
43 Jaques Bouveresse, Wittgenstein Reads Freud, trans. Carol 
Cosman (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1995) p. 13.
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courage lay in his willingness to recognize even his own 
groundbreaking descriptive strategy as what it was, a tool 
with a specific use.
Because we recognize it is not that things must be a 
certain way, we become more self-conscious about how we 
philosophize. We recognize how we become self-forgetful when 
we are captured by certain pictures of thinking, ourselves,
44and how things hang together. But when we recognize the 
potential for the same kind of literalization to take place 
with the things we say (regardless of how much they demand to 
be taken up and overcome as Heidegger's had), we see how we 
are responsible for what we say. The question, though, is 
how we can proceed responsibly, how to continue the 
conversation without the possibility of literalization. The 
answer is that we cannot. The potential for our expressions 
to become dogma always hangs in the background of our 
conversations. The only way to face this possibility is to 
encourage informed criticism and continued inquiry. We 
develop misgivings about accounts framed with the expression 
"how it is possible that ...." We begin to provide 
intellectual therapy for our temptations to canonize our ways 
of speaking. We fall out of love with generality.
However, our discussions do not take the form of a 
negative theology or a tense silence, as though we only want
44 Cf. James Edwards, Ethics Without Philosophy, (Tampa,FL: 
U. South Florida Press, 1985) pp 152-3.
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to make retractions of everything we say. That is, we do not
necessarily have to criticize continually, satirize, and
overturn every one of our attempts at saying something in
favor of saying nothing. Resistance to institutionalization
cannot be found solely in style. Instead, we make it our
business to explore the possibilities of how we can describe
things, gesture toward one another, and organize our lives.
But we must be continually aware of the limits of these
strategies, of their dangers, and of their temptations. And
we can only maintain such a carefulness in a community of
fellow inquirers. That is, it is not a question of what kind
of style of inquiry will avoid being literalized (as those
who mistakenly think the aphorism and metaphor do). Rather,
it is a question about what attitude we will have about our
styles of inquiry, what character we must have in order to
resist homogeneity. So in turn, it is not that we have to
relaese ourselves from all of our conventions and traditions
or criticize every picture we use. Many are still useful and
important to us.
It is true that we can compare a picture that is 
firmly rooted in us to a superstition; but it is 
equally true that we always eventually have to 
reach some firm ground, either a picture or 
something else, so that picture which is at the 
root of all our thinking is tobe respected and not 
treated as a superstition.45
As a consequence, we should have no qualms about developing 
a theory or offering a new description. We are allowed to
45 CV.83
88
have a view (instead of insisting, as the edifying 
philosopher does, that we have no view), but we must make 
sure to use it as a view from a perspective instead of being 
sub specie aeterni.
What Wittgenstein meant by “courage is always original" in 
the discussion of Breuer is clear. This virtue is a state of 
character that pushes us to maintain an honesty about our 
modes of description, to engage others, to criticize, to make 
informed use of conventions, and to be forthright about our 
conventions' contingencies. What we require to be able to 
resist literalization's temptations to take intransitive 
expressions as more than their suggestive language is a 
courage to steel us and prompt us to find new ways of 
speaking. Instead of being philosopical revolutionaries (as 
the systematic philosophers) or philosophical anarchists (as 
the edifying philosophers), we must find the courage to walk 
between the two and to speak critically in a community of 
critical listeners, to be philosopical conversationalists.
Plato's Meno and a Problem for Moral Education
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I
The Meno opens with Meno asking "is virtue something 
that can be taught? Or does it come by practice? Or is it 
neither teaching nor practice that gives it to a man but 
natural aptitude or something else?"1 But the dialogue ends 
with Socrates concluding that "virtue will be acquired 
neither by nature nor by teaching. Whoever has it gets it by 
divine dispensation" (99e). Apparently, virtue comes to us 
by "something else." If Plato is seriously contending virtue 
comes only by way of divine dispensation, his project as a 
philosopher— showing how by applying our reason, we can live 
virtuously and justly— should be at an end. He has proved 
the impossibility of his own enterprise. No matter how hard 
we try to apply our reason, we cannot have an effect beyond 
what the gods have already determined. So why is the Meno 
not Plato's last dialogue? That is, the Meno has 
traditionally been considered a late early dialogue—  one 
that resembles the early dialogues in much of its style 
(direct conversation) and substance (confrontation of 
sophistry), but also different from them in that it continues 
after the interlocutor has been reduced to perplexity. Most 
scholars situate the dialogue's composition date around those 
of the Protagoras and the Gorgias, but before the Symposium 
and the Phaedo. So the problem is, then, if Plato intends
1 Plato, Meno, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, 70a. All subsequent 
references to the Meno will be from this translation.
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the dialogue's conclusion literally, why did he continue to
write philosophy and teach ethics in the Academy?
The challenge Plato poses in the Meno is for his readers
to make sense of how the dialogue works. The pressing
problem is how we reconcile it with the rest of the Platonic
corpus. In earlier (and later) dialogues, Socrates Oontends
2 .that virtue is knowledge. In turn, if virtue is knowledge, 
we can reasonably expect it to be teachable.3 The dialogue's 
explicit conclusion, then, contradicts the Platonic doctrine 
that virtue is knowledge— if virtue cannot be taught, it must 
not be knowledge.4
The dialogue's aporetic conclusion not only gives 
scholars who argue for the unity of Plato's thought 
headaches, but it also is the source of moral anxiety, 
because praise and blame for our actions is groundless if 
this is the case. If virtue comes from divine dispensation, 
we are not responsible for our moral failings or our moral 
successes. If my moral character is determined by factors 
beyond my control, how can I be held responsible for my 
conduct? Those who are vicious should only be pitied and 
avoided, since we can only speak of their bad luck.
2 E.g. Protagoras 360d, Laches 198, Gorgias 460b-d.
3 Socrates, in fact, makes this same move at Meno 89c.
4 Much of this argument relies on the fact that there is not 
a species of knowledge the is not teachable, which, in fact, 
can be construed to be at the core of the problem. What 
seems to be the case in the conversion implicit in moral 
education is that the student must contribute to the 
education in a manner that cannot be taught, but must evoked 
and relied upon.
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Moreover, we have no chance of rehabilitating them. The 
virtuous, on the other hand, deserve no praise or admiration, 
since people only deserve praise for things they have earned 
themselves, not for things that have been given them.5 In a 
sense, we are rendered morally impotent.
In the face of its conclusion that virtue cannot be 
taught, the Meno's drama enigmatically revolves around 
education. Socrates teaches Meno how to pursue philosophical 
investigations. He also teaches Meno's slave some geometry. 
Alexander Sesonske points out that these lessons (most 
notably the demonstration with the slave boy) share the same 
form in that the student progresses through states of 
knowledge according to a certain pattern:
1) the state of unacknowledged ignorance, when one
confidently says incorrectly without knowing,
2) the state of acknowledged ignorance, when one
sees that he does not know and therefore 
cannot say,
3) the state of true opinion which develops from
inquiry, when one confidently says correctly 
without knowing,
4) the state of knowledge, when one knows and
knowingly says, 
and 5) the underlying state of latent knowledge, a kind 
of knowing without saying which makes the 
transition from (1) to (4) possible.6
This progression of states of knowledge amounts to an 
educational model, since it represents a coming to know in
5 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, III.1.1109b.30-35.
6 Alexander Sesonske, "Knowing and Saying: the Structure of 
Plato's Meno," in Plato's Meno: Text and Criticism, ed. 
Alexander Sesonske and Noel Fleming (Belmont: Wadsworth 
Publishing Co., 1965) p. 34.
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the form of a deepening relationship a person has with a 
subject. Students must come to recognize they do not know a
J.
subject to take it upon themselves to pursue further inquiry
into a matter. The problem, though, is how students go from
(2), the state of acknowledged ignorance, to (3), saying
confidently and correctly without knowing. Meno, when he is
reduced to perplexity— i.e., when he is shown that he cannot
answer adequately or correctly about something he claims to
know— states his famous paradox:
But how do you look for something when you don't in 
the least know what it is? How on earth are you 
going to set up something you don't know as the 
object of your search? To put it another way, even 
if you come right up against it, how will you know 
that what you have is the right thing you don't 
know? (80d)
Meno's paradox is divisible into two questions: (i) how do we 
recognize when we are right when we cannot say what our 
criterion for being right is, and (ii) how do we say anything 
at all while knowing we do not know?7 What is implied here, 
then, is that the resolution to the paradox (and the two 
problems it implies) can show how it is possible to go from 
the state of acknowledged ignorance to the state of speaking 
confidently without knowing.
Socrates provides two answers to question (i): the myth
of recollection and his short demonstration with Meno's slave 
boy. The myth of recollection is that souls are immortal and
7 Ibid., p. 91.
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have learned everything that is. As a consequence, when we 
are learning, we are really remembering. Teaching, then, is 
a reminding. However, if taken literally, the myth does not 
provide an account of how we take ourselves from ignorance to 
knowledge, because all it provides is an account of how we 
would be able to do it now that our souls have already 
learned everything. It merely puts off the question of 
recognizing when we are right without having a criterion by 
saying it happened a long time ago.
Regardless of this problem, what the myth does reveal is 
a suppressed premise in the Meno, viz., that we are always in
gpossession of a modicum of knowledge. We are never totally 
ignorant. However, much of that knowledge is tacit and 
unarticulated. What the project is for those who wish to 
know, then, is to bring their tacit knowledge to light and 
lend it an articulate voice. The question, then, is how do 
we do that?
In his conversation with the slave boy, Socrates shows 
Meno how it is possible to recognize speaking correctly even 
without an explicit criterion for being right. He asks the 
slave boy how he would double the area of a 2x2 square he has 
drawn in the sand. The boy confidently responds that he 
should double the length of the sides. Socrates shows the 
boy his error: if he doubles the length of the sides, the 
square's area quadruples instead of doubles. The slave boy
8 Cf. Sesonske, Op. cit., p. 86.
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is reduced to perplexity— he is unable to answer correctly at 
all. He recognizes he does not know. Socrates leads the 
slave boy through a construction which allows him to give a 
correct answer to the geometrical problem. Throughout the 
demonstration, Socrates shows that the boy "was unable to say 
what the answer was or even how to go about finding it..., 
yet he could recognize as true the very things he could not
9say."
Socrates is quick to point out that the slave boy still 
does not know. He says, "...these opinions, being newly 
aroused, have a dreamlike quality," but if the boy were to 
practice the technique Socrates used many times, they would 
become knowledge (85c). The slave boy, then, can be taught 
geometry.
The myth of recollection and Socrates' conversation with 
the slave boy answer the first question in Meno's paradox 
(How do we recognize speaking correctly when we do not have a 
criterion for it?), but the second question in the paradox 
still remains: how do we say anything at all when we know we
do not know? Socrates' discussion with Meno serves to 
illuminate how we would go from the state of acknowledged 
ignorance, where we see that we do not know, and therefore 
cannot say, to the state of true opinion, where we recognize 
saying correctly as saying correctly without knowing.
Because Socrates already knew the answer to the geometrical
9 Sesonske, Op. cit., p. 92, emphasis mine.
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problem he poses for the slave boy, he could only demonstrate 
that it is possible to recognize saying correctly as saying 
correctly without knowing. However, Socrates' method of 
pursuing a definition of virtue, because neither he nor Meno 
know and they recognize their ignorance,10 provides an answer 
to the second question in the paradox. There must be an 
intermediary state between (2) the state of acknowledged 
ignorance and (3) the state of true opinion developed from 
inquiry:
2B) Saying tentatively without knowing; saying 
something which we know we do not know in 
order to see what happens after we say it, 
i.e. saying hypothetically.11
Socrates suggests that they "make use of a hypothesis— the
sort of thing geometers use in their inquiries"(86e). That
is, when we know we do not know the answer to a question, we
do not simply throw our hands up in the air or shrug our
shoulders and give up. Instead, we respond by saying, "I
don't know yet whether it fulfills the conditions, but I
think I have a hypothesis which will help us in the
matter"(87a). We speak tentatively, and when we speak
correctly, we will be able to recognize it as speaking
correctly.
10 This assumption that Socrates does not know what virtue is 
comes from 71a, where he says he has no idea what virtue is. 
It is a necessary part of cooperative inquiry, because the 
way recognizing our own ignorance works is that it prompts us 
to pursue knowledge. If we find that we already know, we 
would not have an impetus to pursue an inquiry.
11 Sesonske, Op. cit., p. 92, emphasis mine.
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11
There is a marked difference between the first two 
states in the educational model at work in the dialogue. The 
first state, speaking confidently out of ignorance, smacks of 
presumption and arrogance. But once one recognizes one's 
ignorance in the second state, that presumption fades into 
carefulness and attentiveness. Arrogance turns to humility. 
When Socrates reduces the slave boy to perplexity, he remarks 
to Meno:
Soc: So in perplexing him and numbing him like the 
stingray, have we done him any harm?
Men: I think not.
Soc: In fact, we have helped him to some extent
toward finding out the right answer, for up to 
now not only is he ignorant of it, he will be 
quite glad to look for it. Up to now, he 
thought he could speak well and fluently, on 
many occasions and before large audiences, on 
the subject....(82d)
Socrates points out two factors here that the reduction to
perplexity overcomes: (i) the student's ignorance of her own
ignorance, and (ii) the student's willingness to act on and
propagate opinions that are in fact wrong. In being reduced
to perplexity, the slave boy not only wishes to pursue the
truth, but also stops confidently speaking falsities. Now,
the moral implications of the difference between not knowing
one does not know how to double the area of a square and
knowing one does not know are not profound, but those of
analogous situations (e.g., knowing one does not know what
virtue, piety, or courage is) are. The Euthyphro is
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illustrative of this difference. Euthyphro brings charges of 
impiety against his own father, but he cannot even explain
what piety is, and he seems not even to be cognizant of his
12own ignorance. The consequences include his father's 
possible death, and he is acting irresponsibly. We suspect 
that if Euthyphro were to recognize his ignorance, he would 
no longer pursue his suit against his father.13
Meno also undergoes a similar change when he is reduced 
to perplexity. He cannot give an adequate definition of 
virtue, so he slowly starts to come to a recognition of his 
ignorance of virtue. That is, he is started on a progression 
from unacknowledged ignorance to acknowledged ignorance by 
the fact that he cannot give a definition of virtue. His 
confidence in his supposed knowledge is waning. The 
progression should take the form:
(i) being thrown into perplexity (not being able
to answer adequately),
(ii) becoming aware of ignorance, 
and (iii) desiring to know.14
Each of these stages accords with and supplements states in
the model for education in that (i) the reduction to
perplexity is the transition stage between (1) the state of
speaking confidently out of ignorance to (2) the state of
recognizing one's own ignorance. For his part, Meno cannot
12 Cf. Euthyphro 15d-e.
13 Of course, Euthyphro has other reasons for pursuing this 
suit beyond his supposed regard for piety. He also wants his 
inheritance, which has been a long time in the coming.
14 Socrates suggests this progression at 84c in his 
description of his discussion with the slave boy.
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answer. He has been thrown into perplexity, and he is coming
to suspect that he does not know what virtue is.
Yet I have spoken about virtue hundreds of times, 
held forth often on the subject in front of large 
audiences, and very well too, or so I thought. Now 
I can't even say what it is. (80b)
The similarity between what Meno says of himself here and
what Socrates says of the slave boy at 84b is much too marked
to be coincidence. Socrates, by using Meno's own expression,
shows his disapproval of Meno's flippancy about the matter by
showing how ridiculous Meno appears to those who either know
(as with geometry) and those who know they do not know (as
with virtue). But Meno lacks patience enough to reflect upon
his perplexity. He does not respond to his inability to
define virtue by admitting his ignorance and expressing a
desire to know what virtue is; instead, he merely admits to
the importance of the problem then proceeds to ask after
virtue's teachability. But this need not mean that Meno's
soul is marred or that he is unfit for inquiry, as some
commentators have suggested.15 Instead, it may merely mean
that it takes longer for the recognition of our own ignorance
in certain matters to come than in others. The slave boy
owns up to his ignorance of geometry much more willingly than
Meno of virtue for a few reasons:
1) The boy has had no training in geometry and has never
15 Cf. Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno (Chicago: U. 
Chicago Press, 1965) p. 186, and Herold Stern, "Philosophy 
and Education in Plato's Meno," Educational Studies, Vol.12, 
Spring 1981, No. 1, pp. 22-34.
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spoken on the matter before, while Meno claims to have 
had extensive training in discussing virtue and has 
spoken about it many times in the past.
2) It is much more obvious when people do not know what
they are doing in geometry than in discussions of
virtue, because there are very concrete ways of 
determining how things are working out in geometry.
That is, Socrates can show the slave boy he is wrong by
pointing out that his suggestion quadruples the area of
the square instead of doubles it. The criteria for the 
adequacy of Meno's account are much more slippery.
3) Meno's conception of, and training in, intellectual 
discussion is more competitive than cooperative. He 
responds incredulously when Socrates admits his own 
ignorance(70c). The boy, on the other hand, has had no 
exposureany style of inquiry, so he has no predilection 
for either competitive or cooperative inquiry.
Meno may be resistant to owning up to not knowing what 
virtue is, but that resistance is not an impossible barrier. 
All it would require for Meno to come to admitting his 
ignorance is a change of how he saw his discussion with 
Socrates— were he to see the discussion as a friendly 
conversation instead of as a competition, he would be more 
inclined to acknowledge his ignorance. Unfortunately, 
Socrates seems to be unable to change Meno's mind about the 
matter.
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III
Thus far I have focused on the moral value of restraint
in recognizing our ignorance in a matter. That is, when we
see we do not know, we are less likely to blunder about as if
we did know. We would not, as Euthyphro does, push to punish
people for impiety if we see we do not know what piety is.
Moreover, we would see what would be implicitly wrong with
such activities— we would see them as hubristic. We would
see them as acts of presumption and irresponsibility. I now
turn to a description of the moral value of the pursuit of
knowledge which comes out of recognizing our ignorance in a
matter. As noted earlier, when reduced to perplexity, we
should be inclined to recognize our own ignorance and be
filled with a desire to come to the truth of the matter. How
we go about pursuing that truth, though, must be restrained
and tentative inquiry, since we do not know--speaking
confidently when we are ignorant is what created to problem
to begin with.
After showing that forays into matters unknown can be
successful {with his discussion with the slave boy), Socrates
attests to the value of not just remaining silent after being
reduced to perplexity, but making a go of it:
I shouldn't like to take my oath on the whole 
story, but one thing I am ready to fight for in 
word and act - that is, that we shall be better, 
braver, and more active men if we believe it is 
right to look for what we don't know than if we 
believe there is no point in looking because what 
we don't know we can never discover.(86b-c)
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We are improved by pursuing the truth. We become better and 
braver because we take responsibility for what we do and say. 
We take a role in shaping our own lives by investigating and 
questioning the concepts that inform our activities. We 
strive to make informed decisions. We own up to actions in 
our past that have been determined by ignorance and 
misconception. We become more active, because acting and 
speaking responsibly requires us to be continually attentive. 
We train ourselves to be honest, intrepid, and thorough in 
our investigations and our evaluations of others' 
investigations.
Socrates, in showing Meno some rudimentary rules for 
defining virtue (e.g., that examples are not definitions, but 
definitions must meet the test of examples), is teaching him 
how to contribute to a cooperative inquiry. He is giving 
Meno the conceptual tools for doing something productive and 
responsible with his inquiry. He is training Meno to respond 
to the necessities of a practice. He is showing Meno what 
excellence is.
We can see, now, how the practice of living the examined 
life engenders virtue. On one hand, we no longer act 
irresponsibly by acting out of ignorance. We recognize the 
problem with acting and speaking confidently when we do not 
know: innocent people (e.g., Euthyphro's father) can suffer 
as a consequence. On the other hand, we take it upon 
ourselves to come to the truth pf the matter so that we may
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not only speak and act confidently but also with knowledge.
We try to make informed and responsible decisions. Once we 
recognize our ignorance, we try to be attentive to how we 
tentatively work things out with those who are our fellow 
inquirers.
IV
The difference between being reduced to perplexity 
(being unable to answer correctly or adequately) and 
recognizing one's own ignorance is the fact that with the 
latter, upon being reduced to perplexity, one must 
acknowledge one's ignorance. That is, teachers can point to 
the fact that students' attempts do not fulfill the 
conditions necessary for adequate accounts, as Socrates does 
with Meno's definitions of virtue, or are simply incorrect, 
as Socrates does with the slave boy's attempts to double the 
size of the 2x2 square, but students must make the gesture of 
acknowledging their own ignorance on their own (no one else 
can do that for them). A student's ignorance can be revealed 
by the teacher, but the student must choose by herself to 
acknowledge that ignorance. The same with the desire to 
pursue an inquiry into the truth of the matter. The impetus 
must be internal. The student must see the value in pursuing 
inquiry, and that impetus cannot be coerced— it can only be 
evoked. The problem, then, is how teachers can lead students
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to come to choose to pursue inquiry by themselves. How can 
an appreciation for the value of inquiry be evoked?
The impetus to continue inquiry is not generated by 
being reduced to perplexity. Meno, when he states his 
paradox— how do we find what we are looking for when we don't 
know what we are looking for?— is balking at the very idea of 
continuing inquiry. The slave boy, when shown he does not 
know, says, "it's no use, Socrates, I just don't know"(84a). 
He has to be shown how to go on. Now, Socrates provides a 
good example for him, and he may emulate Socrates in his 
further attempts at solving similar problems, but what 
motivates him to do this?
An example might make things clearer here. Alasdair 
MacIntyre, in his discussion of virtue and training mentions 
a highly intelligent seven-year-old whom he wishes to teach 
to play chess. The child has no particular interest in 
chess, but she really likes candy and has few chances at 
getting it.
I therefore tell the child that if the child will 
play chess with me once a week, I will give the 
child 50 cents worth of candy; moreover, I tell the 
child that I will always play in such a way that it 
will be difficult, but not impossible, for the 
child to win and that, if the child wins, the child 
will receive an extra 50 cents worth of candy.
Thus motivated, the child plays and plays to win.16
At first, the candy alone is the child's reason for playing
the game. The teacher hopes that at some point along the
16 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame U. Press, 
1981) p. 188.
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way, the child will begin to find some goods specific to
chess— that is, ones that do not necessarily lead to sweets.
At a certain point, the child will develop a taste (so to
speak) for the game— for its gambits, its subtleties, and its
nuances. As a consequence, there can be two kinds of goods
that would motivate the child to play chess:
On one hand there are those goods externally and 
contingently attached to chess-playing and other 
practices by the accidents of social circumstance - 
in the case of the imaginary child candy, in the 
case of real adults such goods as prestige, status 
and money.... On the other hand there are goods 
internal to the practice of chess which cannot be 
had in any way but by playing chess for some other 
game of that specific kind.17
in the case of the first kind of motivation, students are
only taught the value of a practice by what it produces— what
18other goods can be achieved by it. There are many ways for 
MacIntyre's child to get candy, and were one that provided 
more candy on a more regular basis to come along, the child 
motivated solely by the first kind of goods (external goods) 
would stop playing chess altogether. On the other hand, the 
child who has developed a real taste for the game (one who 
has come to appreciate its internal goods) might pursue the 
other way of getting candy also (out of her love for it), but 
would continue to play chess no matter how much candy she
W J 19had.
17 Ibid., p. 188.
18 That is, chess for the child is analogous to the examined 
life and the inquiry necessary for it for Plato's students.
19 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1140b.15-20.
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Socrates, in his discussion with Anytus, suggests that 
the sons of Athens' great men, the sons of Pericles, 
Themistocles, and Thucydides, etc., fall into this chasm 
between appreciating a practice's external goods and 
appreciating its internal goods. They pursue only the goods 
external and accidental to a life of excellence. They pursue 
praise and prestige. Themistocles' son, despite being 
exposed to an example of virtue, grew up to be nothing more 
than a skilled horseman (93d). Thucydides' sons came to be 
esteemed wrestlers (94c). But none of them esteemed 
themselves by being virtuous men, despite being given the 
best education in Athens and having virtuous fathers as role 
models. These men came to see virtue as one means for 
attaining praise among many. They, no matter their exposure 
to their fathers' examples of virtue, never came to see its 
internal goods. Just as the child who would give up on chess 
when a more effective candy-procuring means is made 
available, these men lost interest in pursuing excellence 
when more readily masterable exercises came to be available. 
What the problem comes to, then, is that we can provide the 
necessary conditions for seeing the value of inquiry, but we 
cannot provide the sufficient conditions for students to see 
that value. That is, students must recognize their own 
ignorance in a matter for them to see the value of pursuing 
the truth of the matter, but having their ignorance pointed 
out to them is not sufficient to produce the desire to
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inquire. Students may be shown the value of inquiry, but 
they must take it upon themselves to see it.
V
In the opening moments of the dialogue, Socrates
compares how, in Thessaly, Gorgias teaches his students to
answer questions and how Athenians answer questions.
Gorgias, when he arrived in Larissa, captured the hearts of
the noblemen there. He then taught Meno and the other
members of the nobility the art of oratory:
In particular, he grot you in the habit of answering 
any question you might be asked, with the 
confidence and dignity appropriate to those who 
know the answers, just as he himself invites 
questions of every kind from everyone in the Greek 
world who wishes to ask, and never fails to answer 
them (70c, emphasis mine).
Gorgias teaches his students to speak confidently and with
authority, but he does not teach them to question each other.
He does not give his students the tools to tell good
arguments from bad ones; he only teaches them to distinguish
when speakers are confident or not. The way disagreements
are to be worked out, then, is by way of a struggle of wills,
a shouting match, a rhetorical duel. There is no method or
standard by which competing claims can be adjudicated and
reconciled.
On the other hand, Socrates says that in Athens, "it is 
the reverse." The citizens of Athens make no pretenses to 
knowing things they do not know. Socrates ironically remarks
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that it is as if all the wisdom had migrated from Athens to
Larissa, since:
if you put your question to any of our people, they 
would all alike laugh and say, You must think I am 
singularly fortunate, to know whether virtue can be 
taught or how it is acquired. The fact is that far 
from knowing whether it can be taught, I have no 
idea what virtue is (71a).
Socrates then counts himself one of the Athenians who would
admit to not knowing what virtue is. The point of this
contrast between Athenian and Thessalian dialogical character
is to demonstrate two ways we may cope with the suspicion
that we may not know. Either we can feign confidence in what
we say in order to convince those around us to take what we
say to be right, or we can admit that we do not know, speak
tentatively, and aspire to find the truth of the matter. As
noted earlier, from the point of view of the latter, the
former method is a training in presumption and
irresponsibility. It is tantamount to a training in
complacency in ignorance. However, from the perspective of
the competitive speaker (the Larissan and sophist), Socrates'
admission of ignorance is just as incomprehensible. Meno is
taken aback at Socrates' admission. He asks, "is this the
report we are to take home about you?"(71c) In Meno's eyes,
Socrates has lost the competition before it even gets
started, because the whole point of the competitive model of
inquiry is to get others to admit they do not know. As a
consequence, when Socrates reduces him to perplexity later in
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the dialogue, Meno responds with his puzzle instead of 
admitting to his ignorance. He does not want to lose, but he 
cannot see that Socrates is not trying to beat him.
Meno's first definition of virtue for a man is that it 
"consists of managing the city's affairs capably...so that he 
will help his friends and injure his foes while taking care 
to come to no harm himself"(71e). His final attempt to 
define virtue is that it is "to rejoice in the fine and have 
power"(77b). Both of these definitions are clues to Meno's 
predilection for types of inquiry and his motivations for 
praising and pursuing virtue— namely, that he pursues virtue 
and inquiry for their external goods. He is interested in 
virtue because of what comes with it— success, fine things, 
pleasure, power, etc.. He pursues inquiry for similar 
reasons— to win arguments and not only to have the power of 
convincing people they do not know, but to have the power of 
convincing people that he does know. As a consequence, he is 
inclined to think of inquiry as coercion and confrontation.
Later, after he has given an example of an adequate 
definition of shape, Socrates makes a distinction between 
kinds of questioners: "the clever, disputatious, and
quarrelsome kind," and "friendly people, like you and me, 
[who] want to converse with each other"(75c-d). The first 
kind are out to refute one another. They work alone. The 
other kind proceed in a manner more conducive to discussion. 
They try to maintain the milder and gentler conversational
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manner of inquiry. They try to cooperate in their
investigation.
Anytus' mistrust of Socrates comes out when Socrates
confounds him by producing counter-examples to his contention
that virtue can be taught in Athens. He himself is one of
the contentious types of fellow inquirers, and he suspects
Socrates of being one. He warns Socrates:
You seem to me, Socrates, to be too ready to run 
people down. My advice to you, if you will listen 
to it, is to be careful. I dare say that in all 
cities it is easier to do a man harm than good, and 
it is certainly so here, as I expect you know 
yourself.(94e)
He thinks Socrates is only out to humiliate by proving people 
do not know. He does not see any value in Socrates' showing 
him that he is wrong in thinking that virtue can be taught in 
Athens, since he is more interested in maintaining his 
appearance of confidence and dignity as one who knows than in 
actually being one who knows. For Anytus, too, inquiry into 
the truth of matters of which he does not know and the 
excellence it engenders is only a means to ends well beyond 
it— namely, having power and seeking pleasure.
VI
The Meno's theory of moral education, though it shows 
how it is possible to teach virtue, also points to the 
indissoluble resistances to seeing the goods internal to 
inquiry. Plato presents a situation in which all the
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necessary conditions can be met for moral education to be 
successful-— a reduction to perplexity, a good role model, 
time for meticulous investigation, a subject with definite 
requirements— but all these conditions do not amount to a 
sufficient condition for virtue to be taught. That is, 
Socrates can show Meno and Anytus the value implicit in 
admitting they do not know, but, yet proceeding with their 
inquiries, but he cannot make them see the value in it. 
Students of virtue must come to see the goods internal to 
inquiry on their own. They can be given the tools, but only 
they can decide to use them. Even when conditions are 
optimal, as with the sons of Athens' great men, students may 
never come to a recognition of the goods internal to the 
examined life.
Much of this resistance comes from a certain idea of 
freedom, viz., that freedom implies that we always know what 
we really want and what is good for us, and any correction or 
scepticism from anybody else is an imposition. Socrates 
gestures toward this idea of freedom when he chastises Meno 
for resisting the necessities of the subject at hand (86c). 
Meno values his freedom, and as a consequence, he makes no 
attempt to govern his actions to accord with the demands that 
his inquiry with Socrates entails. He refuses to be told 
what to do even when it has been made clear that (and how) it 
is for his own good. He acknowledges the importance of 
pursuing a definition of virtue before inquiring into its
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attributes, but is ambivalent to it: "All the same, I would
rather consider the question as I put it at the 
beginning"(86c). He seems complacent in his ignorance— as if 
he is sure his confidence will win the day when he is around 
anyone other than Socrates.
This brings us to a re-evaluation of the dialogue's 
conclusion. What has been shown here is not, as thought 
before, that no matter how hard we try to apply our reason, 
we cannot overcome the determinations the gods have made. 
Instead, it is clear that by applying our reason, we can 
improve ourselves. Plato's philosophical project is safe, 
then. What the conclusion that virtue comes from divine 
dispensation comes to, then, is a gesture toward the mystery 
of how the student switches from pursuing inquiry for 
external goods to internal goods. Some students respond and 
some do not— even when conditions are optimal. Some students 
will continually see the practice of examining one's life as 
a means to something beyond it, while others will see the ' 
value implicit in it. The success of teaching virtue, then, 
does not entirely depend on how the teaching goes about. The 
student must contribute on her own, and the teacher can never 
be able to bring that about.
The earlier distinction between the quarrelsome 
questioners and the conversational questioners (at 75d) is at 
the heart of the issue here. What moral education amounts to 
is a change of character, and when certain dispositions that
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cannot be effected by anyone else but the student are the 
preconditions for, or preclusions of, successful moral 
inquiry, from the point of view of the educator, education is 
as much a question of grace as it is of cirriculum. For the 
student as for the teacher, the transition comes out of 
nowhere. The value of the examined life becomes evident in 
the same way that aspects of certain pictures snap into focus 
when reflected upon (e.g., the Jastrow duck-rabbit). An 
account of how the change comes about cannot be given, 
because it would require a description from within a certain 
framework, and the transition in moral education is a change 
of frameworks.
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